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ABSTRACT 
A large body of research has examined the impact of takeovers on corporate 
performance. Although there has been a considerable volume of research on the 
wealth effects of takeovers to date, there has been very little evidence on the 
disciplinary role. The aim of this study is to contribute to the takeover debate by 
examining whether UK takeovers are disciplinary.  
This study replicates previous findings on whether the market for corporate 
control benefits firm managers or whether it is an avenue to maximise shareholder 
wealth. This study examines 153 UK takeover bids in the period 1990 to 1997. This 
period was chosen because it coincides with the publication of the Cadbury Report in 
1992 when issues of corporate governance were raised and prescriptive 
recommendations were made to safeguard shareholder investment. 
In this study, results based on the evaluation of the share price suggest that 
targets of a takeover bid under-perform in the period prior to the bid. Accounting 
results also suggest that targets under-perform in the same period and this is 
consistent with the view that takeovers perform a disciplinary function when assets 
are reallocated to their most productive use. However, post bid share price 
performance shows modest improvement while accounting results suggest that 
managers of bidding firms fail to improve the operating performance of the combined 
firm. The findings of this study therefore dispel the notion that takeover bids are made 
in shareholders’ interests. The results suggest that UK takeovers are not disciplinary, 
but are undertaken to generate short-term economic benefits to managers at the 
expense of shareholders.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 STUDY OVERVIEW 
News about mergers and acquisitions are dominating the financial press in market 
economies today. The announcement of a merger or an acquisition conveys certain 
information about the acquiring and target firms involved and their management. Mergers 
and acquisitions fall under the category of corporate structuring with the view to make 
the firms more efficient. Stakeholders in this area, including shareholders, corporate 
managers, the academia, the public at large and the financial press have examined the 
benefits of mergers and acquisitions and report that the merger phenomenon indeed is the 
alternative answer to quick corporate growth. In the same vein, some have questioned 
whether these business combinations benefit the ultimate owner, the ordinary shareholder 
or whether managers use mergers to advance their interests and marginalize shareholders 
(Williamson, 1964). As a result mergers and acquisitions have provoked debate in the 
academic sector on the justification of mergers and acquisitions in market economies. 
One body of research alleges that mergers and acquisitions are beneficial because they 
are used for quick corporate growth, which in turn generates bigger profits for 
shareholders in the future and favorable wealth effects for shareholders around the date of 
announcement of the acquisition (Jensen 1988). Market studies however suggest that 
higher gains accrue to target firm shareholders while bidding firm shareholders do not 
benefit from acquisitions. This hypothesis does not support the view that managers of 
acquiring firms act on behalf of shareholders when they take the acquisition decision 
purportedly to maximize shareholder wealth. Other studies suggest that mergers and 
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acquisitions occur to discipline managers of poorly performing firms by reallocating 
assets from unproductive to productive use (Manne 1965, Jensen and Meckling 1976, and 
Martin and McConnell, 1991).  
Mergers are defined as business combinations where both firms combine their 
financial and human resources to operate as one firm. Acquisitions are described as those 
that occur when one firm acquires more than 51% of the shares of another firm with a 
view to control its management and its assets. When viewed in the disciplinary light, 
mergers and acquisitions are defined as those that are preceded by poor performance for 
target firms and superior performance for bidding firms. The objective of this study 
therefore is to find further evidence, as to whether targets of a UK takeover bid under 
perform in the period prior to the bid.    
A number of studies suggest that there is no difference in the prior performance of 
target and non target firms, and also that there is very little tangible evidence as to 
whether firms involved in takeover bids improve performance in the period following 
takeover bids. If this is true, then takeovers occur for other reasons other than performing 
a disciplinary function. Due to the apparent differences in the results in previous research 
on whether targets under perform bidders or other firms in similar economic 
environment, this study aims to contribute to the takeover debate by examining whether 
the UK takeover market is disciplinary, that is, whether the takeover mechanism is used 
to remove inefficient managers and replacing them with efficient managers. The 
disciplinary role is further enhanced if shareholders of target firms are unable to 
discipline a poor performing management team due to ineffective internal controls. The 
takeover market, in this situation, is viewed as a court of last resort (Jensen 1988). 
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Further, this study examines whether the disciplinary role of takeovers for UK firms is 
declining due to improvements in corporate governance compliance in the period around 
the publication of the Cadbury Report 1992. 
Although mergers and acquisitions aim at increasing shareholders wealth, a 
number of studies suggest that corporate mergers fail because acquiring firm stock prices 
are likely to decrease when mergers are announced. Most acquired companies are sold off 
after the merger, as profits do not improve after the acquisition of poorly performing 
firms.  
1.2 MOTIVATION 
It is interesting to find that firms continue to seek corporate growth through 
mergers and acquisitions but fail to achieve that purpose and yet continue to use the 
firms’ financial resources on these transactions in unprofitable business combinations. 
The debate on the usefulness and effectiveness of takeovers as a disciplinary mechanism 
is ongoing. Evidence of whether targets of a takeover bid under perform prior to a 
takeover bid is still scanty in UK as most focus on the wealth effects of a takeover bid 
and very little focus on the disciplinary role (Franks, Harris and Titman, 1991; Franks 
and Harris, 1989; Kini, Kracaw and Mian, 1995). The aim of this study to fill this gap by 
examining, whether targets of a takeover bid perform poorly when compared to 
corresponding bidding firms in the period prior to the bid. In the spirit of Fama, Fisher, 
Jensen and Roll (1969), Barber and Lyon (1996), and Ghosh (2001) this study evaluates 
share price around the dates of announce of the bid and also examine the operating 
performance of both bidders and targets in the period prior to the bid year. Post bid 
operating performance is also compared to pre bid operating performance to determine 
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whether takeovers are profitable. This study also explores the effects of corporate control 
arising from the different roles management and shareholders play in making corporate 
decisions made in the best interest of the firm.    
 
1.3 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The main objective of this study is to provide evidence as to whether takeovers 
are disciplinary. Specifically, the study provides evidence on whether the pre bid 
performance of bidders is superior to that of target firms and that firms become targets of 
a bid because of poor performance. Secondly, this study examines the performance of 
firms in bids that are perceived as disciplinary and compared with other firms operating 
in the same market but perceived not to receive a bid because of superior performance. 
These bids are those that report changes in top management following a successful bid 
and those bids that are hostile. Thirdly, this study provides evidence as to whether there 
are improvements in corporate performance for firms in both successful and lapsed bids. 
In order to achieve these objectives the study will test for evidence on the disciplinary 
role of take-over bids by analysis of financial characteristics of companies involved in 
friendly and hostile bids and by examination of the characteristics of target companies 
that survive unwelcome bids.  
This study focuses on two broad hypotheses. The first hypothesis is that bidders 
are likely to be more profitable than targets in the period prior to the takeover bids. The 
second hypothesis is that targets surviving unwelcome bids will improve their financial 
performance following the abandonment of the bid. 
 4
1.4 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
Takeovers should lead to gains in share price performance and improved 
profitability due to increased efficiency (Jensen, 1984). Although there has been 
considerable body of evidence on the wealth effects of take-over, to date there has been 
little evidence on the disciplinary role for UK takeovers except for Franks and Mayer 
(1996) and Kini et al. (1995). Kini et al., report that take-overs are a direct consequence 
of the breakdown of internal control mechanisms. Weak internal controls may be due to 
sub-optimal corporate governance characteristics such as duality, large shareholdings for 
top management, board composition having fewer outside directors and dispersed 
shareholders. Where such weak corporate governance characteristics dominate, it is most 
unlikely that management over ride of internal controls will be addressed. The motivation 
for this study is to find further evidence on the disciplinary role of takeovers by using a 
UK dataset in the period around the Cadbury Report 1992.  
1.5 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The current study focuses on takeovers of UK companies that were announced in 
the period 1st January1990 to 31 December 1997. The takeover sample excludes firms 
that are not listed on the London Stock Exchange, and foreign firms due to the view that 
accounting and share price data may be difficult to consolidate because of different 
reporting currencies. The initial sample of takeover bids is composed of 738 bids that 
were made in the period from 1 January 1990 to 31 December 1997. The sample period 
has been chosen to coincide with the period around the issue of the Cadbury Report of 
1992. The Cadbury Report deals with issues of corporate governance that protect 
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shareholders investment from management misallocation of financial resources by 
strengthening internal controls (Cadbury, A., (1992) 
There are two research approaches generally employed in addressing the impact 
of takeover bids on shareholders and the discussion of the superior measure is elucidated 
in the Linn and Switzer (2001) study. One approach is to use share price data to estimate 
the distribution of gains and losses to shareholders. Share price studies are based on event 
study methodologies that have focused on announcement period returns. The method for 
evaluating share price performance around the date of announcement is the event study 
approach of Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll (1969) which focuses on examining the 
cumulative abnormal return in different event periods around the takeover bid. The 
second approach for evaluating the performance of firms involved in this study is by 
using accounting data where the accounting measure of performance is operating 
performance focusing on profitability. Evaluation of mergers and acquisition based on the 
analyzing accounting data intended to assess the economic impact of acquisitions by 
testing for changes in the profitability of the combined firm. This study evaluates 
accounting performance using the industry and size adjusted operating performance 
return benchmark (Healy, Palepu and Ruback, 1992 and Ghosh, 2001).    
1.6 CHAPTER ORGANISATION 
This study is organized as follows. Motives of takeover bids, classification of 
takeover bids, and review of previous evidence are discussed in chapter 2. The research 
methodologies are discussed in chapter 3. Empirical results for share price performance 
are reported in chapter 4. Accounting results are reported in chapter 5. Chapter 6 is the 
summary and conclusion of the study.  
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CHAPTER 2 
MOTIVES AND CLASSIFICATION OF TAKEOVER BIDS 
2.1 CHAPTER OBJECTIVES 
The main objective of this chapter is to examine reported motives for mergers and 
acquisitions in order to distinguish disciplinary from non-disciplinary bids. The second 
objective of this chapter is to review how takeover bids are classified in literature. The 
third objective is to review evidence for bids that are perceived to be disciplinary. 
2.2 JUSTIFICATION FOR DISCIPLINARY BIDS 
Modern corporations, by nature are run by managers with a view to make profit 
for shareholders (Berle and Means, 1936; Coarse, 1937; Hindley, 1969 and Donaldson, 
1984). A takeover bid is an offer by a company to the shareholders of another company 
with a view to take over the control of that company. This is consistent with the 
shareholder wealth maximization theory whereby one firm bids for another with the view 
to maximize shareholder value and improve operating performance (Bhagat, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1990).  Managers of the acquiring firms believe that if they takeover the control 
of target firm’s resources they will maximize shareholder value (Jensen and Ruback, 
1983; Limmack 2000). The increase in value of shares for the combined company is 
usually expected to arise from synergy, replacement of the management of the target 
firm, and, disposals of sub optimal assets following successful takeover bids (Martin and 
McConnell 1991). 
Financial literature posit that a takeover is a disciplinary device for identifying 
and disciplining managers who under perform, due to complacence, inefficiency, lack of 
tact, poor organizational skills as well as pursuing excessive corporate growth at the 
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expense of the owners of the firm (Baumol, 1959). In the market for corporate control, 
predators monitor the under performance of firms and launch takeover bids (Jarrell, 
Brickley and Netter (1988). Once successful the acquiring firm managers may remove 
the under performing managers and replace them with managers of their choice 
(Chatterjee, 1986). Grossman and Hart (1981), and Scharfstein (1988) view the takeover 
as a disciplinary device that motivates managers to perform better. Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) argue that a takeover plays a disciplinary role as an alternative device where 
internal disciplinary mechanisms fail or are ineffective.  A disciplinary takeover is also 
the means to prune out dead wood (Walsh and Ellwood, 1991)  
Acquisitions are viewed as a mechanism by which the market replaces 
incompetent management (Manne, 1965; and Solow, 1967). The market expects bidding 
firms to improve the management of target firms and thereby increase net cash flows. In 
this respect, the market enables investors to systematically identify and purchase 
undervalued stocks. Acquiring poorly managed firms and removing incumbent 
management, or at least changing existing management policy or practices, should make 
these firms more valuable, allowing the acquirer to claim the increase in value.   
The announcement of a takeover bid therefore conveys certain information about 
the target firm. Capital market studies suggest that the market will impound anticipated 
performance gains in the share price of the target firm during the announcement period 
(Sharma and Ho, 2002). Managers of acquiring firms believe that some target firms are 
poorly managed and to improve those companies the firm should be acquired and dismiss 
the incumbent management team. The replacement of the incumbent management may 
then be a source of gains for the acquired entity (Mandelker, 1974). This assertion is 
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based on the assumption that the acquiring firm’s performance is superior to that of the 
acquired firm. In this scenario, the takeover becomes an avenue where managers of 
poorly performing firms are replaced by better performing managers. The poor 
performance of the target firm is attributable to the incumbent management of the firm, 
rather than to market or industry factors beyond management control. Change in top 
management or change in management practices should follow the takeover.     
 Manne (1965) suggests that the existence of the market for corporate control 
provides the opportunity for shareholders of the target firm to profit from a merger 
especially when they sell their shares to the acquiring firm at a premium.  According to 
Manne’s theory of corporate control, takeovers are disciplinary in nature, and they are 
designed to remove under performing and ineffective management. Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997) argue that takeovers exist to ensure that under performing management is 
removed when target shareholders accept a tender offer from the acquiring company.  
It is also a common occurrence that takeover bids fail. Some managers of target 
firms view the takeover as a threat to their job security and such it acts as a spur to 
improve the operating performance of the target firm.   These managers feel threatened 
by takeovers as they impinge on their discretion to control the firm exposed to takeover 
bids. Some managers address this threat by making decisions that improve the 
performance of their firms as well as taking other counter measures such as exposing 
weaknesses in the performance of bidding firms.   
The disciplinary theory of takeovers first came light after studies by Alchian 
(1950), and Marris (1963), among others, who suggest that there are three broad theories 
that explain the incidence of disciplinary takeovers. Firstly, takeovers are seen as a means 
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of identifying and eliminating managers, who are static, are inefficient, and display 
organizational slack. Secondly, disciplinary takeovers arise where managers of target 
firms sacrifice profit as they pursue corporate growth at the expense of shareholders 
(Baumol, 1959 and Marris, 1963). Chatterjee (1986) reported that managers who sacrifice 
shareholder interest in order to maximize their own interests find their companies taken 
over by a predator who can restore the company’s profitability and realize a substantial 
capital gain.  
An inefficient management is defined as one that does not maximize shareholder 
value, or one that maximizes own interest at the expense of shareholders. At the same 
time the threat of a takeover constrains managerial behavior towards value maximization, 
assuming the dominant managerial objective is growth maximization, which is 
inconsistent with value maximization.                                                                                                                  
The disciplinary motive for takeover also stems from the assumption that poor 
performance of a firm is the caused by a management that is reckless, inefficient and self- 
centered (Agrawal, Jaffe and Mandelker, 1992). Since a takeover is a means by which 
managers may be disciplined or displaced, new owners can impose the much-needed 
discipline after the acquisition (Walsh, 1988, 1989). This is called the inefficient 
management hypothesis (Brearly and Myers 2000). In capitalist economies, corporate 
performance is the standard for assessing management efficiency and managerial 
efficiency is observed when shareholder wealth is maximized (Scherer, 1988). 
Disciplinary takeovers are common where corporate managers do not pursue value- 
maximizing behavior, which may lead to the inefficient use of the resources under their 
control.  
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In a disciplinary bid, target firms are associated with under performance in the 
period prior to a takeover bid. Target firms in a disciplinary bid are also associated with 
changes in the management of the firm following the bid. Improvements in the operating 
performance and economic gains following takeover bids also suggest poor managerial 
performance of target firms (Brown and da Silva Rosa, 1997).    
Weston, Chung and Hoag (1990, p. 192) define inefficient management as failure 
by management to perform to its full potential or just an inept management. The 
inefficient management hypothesis also assumes, in the first instance, that shareholders of 
acquired firms are unable to discipline their own managers and thus it is necessary to 
invoke the costly mergers to replace inefficient managers. Fama (1980), however, argues 
that the discipline of managers comes through managerial labor markets. Manne (1965) 
argues that the acquiring firm’s managers must be familiar with the operations of the 
target if they believe they can improve its performance. Proponents of the theory may 
argue that mergers do not imply the inability of the owners to replace their inefficient 
managers, but the scarcity of able managers in the market (Weston et al, 1990). Secondly, 
the assumption is that if the replacement of the incompetent managers is the sole motive 
for the merger, then the target could be operated as a subsidiary. Replacement of 
managers via the takeover process is an indication that disciplining an inefficient 
management is a motive taken concurrently with other motives for takeover and thirdly, 
that the managers will be replaced post takeover if any improvement in the acquired firm 
could be made or observed. 
The inefficient management hypothesis posits that the market for corporate 
control is the court of resort and it useful when internal control mechanisms do not work.  
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These mechanisms involve those that are internally initiated within the corporation and 
those that are available by the outside market for corporate control (Denis and Denis 
1995; Warner, Watts, and Wruck 1988; and Wiesbach 1988). Internal control 
mechanisms include competition by managers within the firm the control function of the 
board of directors and the monitoring role of large shareholders (Weston et al., 1990, 
p.458). External mechanisms may be invoked when internal mechanisms fail to correct 
managerial failure. 
The main internal control mechanism is the board of directors (Wiesbach 1988). 
Consistent with this view, Sudarsanam (1995) reiterated that the board structure has been 
identified as an important component of effective monitoring, especially where its 
composition consists of a sufficient proportion of independent or non-executive directors 
and the separation of the role of chairman of the board and the chief executive officer. 
Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) provide evidence that the board of directors can 
effectively deal with the problems affecting the firm and that when a company under 
performs its relatively health industry, it is easier for the board to assess blame and fire 
top management.   
The second internal control mechanism is the monitoring function by large 
shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Stulz, 1988).  Shleifer and Vishny suggest that 
the increase of shareholding by large shareholders has implications on the probability of 
the large shareholder making a tender offer and taking over the firm eventually, and the 
large shareholder taking up control through the voting process. They also assert that the 
large shareholder monitors the firm’s management and engages itself in jawboning, proxy 
contests and takeovers as needed. Stulz (1988) also provides evidence that large 
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shareholders provide some monitoring process on managers. Monitoring by creditors, 
especially financial institutions also provide a way to control unacceptable managerial 
behavior (Brearly and Myers, 2000)  
The third internal monitoring mechanism includes appropriate incentive structures 
to align managers’ interests with those of shareholders. Agreements are also made where 
compensation is tied to performance. Such compensation agreements include bonuses 
and executive stock options over and above a reasonable pay and other perquisites.   
The disciplinary motive of takeover motive argues that takeovers are a 
mechanism by which managers of a firm who fail to maximize its market value are 
replaced by efficient managers. Since takeovers may result in the replacement of poorly 
performing managers, the threat of a takeover also provides a useful mechanism for 
encouraging managers to pursue shareholder wealth maximization strategies and this is 
more prominent in failed bids.  
When internal mechanisms are not sufficient to control agency problems the 
market for corporate control provides an external control of last resort (Manne 1965, 
Jensen and Ruback 1983). Shareholders look to external control mechanisms especially 
when the board of directors becomes ineffective. Sudarsanam (1995) confirmed that the 
independence of non-executive directors might not always be assured. In fact, the 
external control mechanisms are invoked when all internal controls have failed to address 
managerial failure (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  
Denis and Serrano (1995) argue that corporate managers who depart from value 
maximizing policies can be replaced through either board dismissals or takeovers. A 
takeover through a tender offer or proxy fight enables outside management to gain 
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control of the decision processes while circumventing existing managers if a firm’s 
management lagged in performance either because of inefficiency or because of agency 
problems. The effectiveness of takeovers as a disciplinary mechanism is the replacement 
of the managers of the acquired firm.   
Mayer (2000) identifies disciplinary takeovers as those with the following 
characteristics. Firstly, there must be evidence of poor relative performance of target firm 
prior to the takeover. Secondly, there must be evidence of the departure of the target 
firm’s inefficient managers following the takeover and thirdly, the acquired firm’s assets 
are used more efficiently following the takeover.  
Martin and McConnell (1991) identify disciplinary takeovers as those where the 
top manager of the target firm leaves the firm for non-normal reasons soon after the 
takeover. Normal reasons include normal retirement such as having reached the 
retirement age, or, having been voted out of office in a normal annual general meeting, 
or, illness or death. They also identify disciplinary takeovers as those preceded by poor 
performance of the targets firms. 
Franks and Mayer (1996) examine the disciplining function of hostile takeovers 
and look at the evidence of the dismissal of target firm managers, significant corporate 
restructuring following takeover and poor prior performance by firms subjected to hostile 
bids.  
Dahya and Powell (1996) examined UK takeovers and found that takeovers are 
followed by target management dismissals and significant corporate restructuring. They 
also found that targets under perform in the period prior to takeover bid.    
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2.3 MOTIVES FOR DISCIPLINARY BIDS   
2.3.1 SYNERGY AND TOP MANAGEMENT CHANGES 
Financial literature distinguishes motives for takeover bids that maximize wealth 
and those that destroy wealth. Motives of takeover bids that are perceived to benefit 
shareholders include those that generate gains from synergy (Limmack, 1994). Takeover 
bids motivated by synergistic reasons contend that two firms combined operate more 
efficiently and are worth more together than separate (Bradley, Kim and Desai, 1988; 
Jensen and Ruback 1983; Morck, Shleifer and Vishny 1988).  
Synergy is defined as the potential additional value from combining two firms. 
Synergy is the difference in value of the combined company as a single entity and the 
values of the individual companies. Synergy is sub classified into operating synergy and 
financial synergy. Operating synergies enable companies to reduce unnecessary 
expenditure arising from complimentary activities thereby improve its efficiency 
(Penrose, 1959 and Porter, 1987). Sources of operating synergy include economies of 
scale, greater pricing power, combination of different functional strengths and higher 
growth in new or existing markets. Sharing fixed assets improves efficiency as it reduced 
costs by using the same infrastructure for an increased number of operations. Operating 
synergy, on the other hand, arises in vertical and horizontal acquisitions, and sometimes 
in conglomerates and in unrelated acquisitions (Mueller, 1977; and Hughes 1993). On the 
other hand, financial synergies arise inform of higher cash flows or a lower cost of 
capital.   Financial synergies can lower the costs of internal financing as compared to 
external financing. Takeovers create an opportunity for combination of a firm with excess 
cash but with limited project opportunities with another firm with high return projects but 
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with limited cash. Financial synergies also arise from increase in debt capacity. The 
increase in debt capacity allows companies to improve their cash flows because the 
combined firm would borrow more as one firm than they would as individual entities. 
Financial synergies also arise in takeovers in form of tax relief when some profitable 
companies acquire loss-making firms to reduce the tax burden (Lewellan, 1971 and Choi 
and Phillipatos, 1983).  
Managerial synergy also arises from combination of two or more firms. Managers 
of acquired firms may be replaced after the takeover bid. This may be due to overlapping 
responsibilities between acquiring firm management and acquired firm management. In 
most cases however, managers of the acquired firm are replaced if they do not possess 
firm specific technical skills that would be essential in the combined firm.   
2.3.2 ACQUISITION OF UNDERVALUED FIRMS 
Takeovers also benefit shareholders of the acquiring firm when their firm acquires 
undervalued firms. Mergers are a form of investment (Arnold, 2005) and should be 
evaluated on essentially the same criteria as other investment decisions.  Some companies 
that are undervalued by financial markets can be targets for acquisition by those who 
recognize this mis-pricing. The acquirer purchases the undervalued firm at a price lower 
than it is actually worth. The acquired firm adds value to the acquirer by the difference in 
value between purchase price and actual value (Berger and Ofek, 1995; and, Comment 
and Jarrell, 1995). In order to realize this gain, the acquirer should be able to identify 
firms that trade at less than their true value. The managers of bidding firms may possess 
superior information about the target firm and acquire the assets of the firm at a discount 
(Myers and Majluf, 1984; Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1987). If managers of the bidding 
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firm have this superior information, they will bid for the target firm with a view to gain 
from the acquisition (Pound, 1988). Bradley, Kim and Desai (1983) refers to possessing 
asymmetric information about an undervalued firm as: ‘sitting on a golden mine 
hypothesis’ Managers of bidding firms may have private information such as future 
growth opportunities, strategic market position as well as sitting on land that may have 
oil deposits which other market participants may not be aware of. The sitting on a gold 
mine hypothesis however suggests that it is in conflict with the efficient market 
hypothesis where the share price of an asset should reflect all available information. In 
this case, the bidder may offer to acquire shares in such firms at below their true value. 
An efficient market is defined as one where the share price of a firm fully incorporates all 
available information on that security and that share price provides accurate signals for 
resource allocation.  
2.4 CLASSIFICATION OF TAKEOVER BIDS AND DEVELOPMENT OF 
HYPOTHESES FOR THIS STUDY  
Financial literature suggests that pre bid characteristics have an impact on post bid 
returns (Agrawal and Jaffe, 1995, 2003, and, Gregory, 1997). Takeover bids are therefore 
classified according to whether they are disciplinary or non-disciplinary, friendly or 
hostile, and, successful or unsuccessful bids.   
Literature suggests that disciplinary bids are more likely to be hostile while non-
disciplinary bids are likely to be friendly (Morck, Shleifer and Vishny 1990).  Other 
studies define disciplinary takeovers as those that are followed by top management 
changes following successful bids (Martin and McConnell 1991). Sometimes managerial 
replacements arise due to the retirement of the incumbent top executive of the firm or by 
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death. In such cases, a successful takeover bid speeds up the turnover. Disciplinary bids 
are also defined as those that target poorly performing firms. Non-disciplinary bids are 
those that may or may not be preceded by poor performance of target firms and those that 
may not be followed by replacement of top management other than due to routine 
retirement of incumbent.    
In view of this classification, the first hypotheses for evaluating pre acquisition 
corporate performance is based on the premise that target firms under perform prior to a 
takeover bid: 
H1 Targets perform worse than bidders in the period prior to a take-over bid 
H2 The pre bid performance of targets where there is management change following 
the bid is worse than the pre bid performance of targets where there is no top 
management change. 
The outcome of a successful takeover bid automatically transfers control of the 
acquired firm to the acquiring firm management. Following a successful bid, the acquired 
firm’s managers may be dismissed, demoted, or they may voluntarily resign. However, 
some managers of the acquired firm can be retained if they have requisite firm specific 
technical skills.    
Not all take-over bids are successful (Limmack, 1991; Pickering, 1976; Dennis 
and McConnell, 1986 and Parkinson and Dobbins, 1993). Target firm management may 
successfully contest a takeover bid until it lapses. Some contests depend on whether the 
price offered for shares as sub-optimal, or the managers may desire to safeguard their 
jobs (Schwert, 2000).  When the initial takeover bid is rejected for any other reason, a 
hostile bid is deemed to have occurred. 
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Some takeover bids that arise through the tender process. Such bids are more 
hostile in nature (Morck, Shleifer and Vishny 1988; Martin and McConnell 1991). 
Friendly bids are viewed as non-disciplinary and these are defined as those bids that 
target management recommend to shareholders to accept without any resistance (Bradley, 
Desai and Kim 1988, and Schwert 2000).        
 The second hypothesis is based on the view that hostile bids are more likely to 
generate more gains than friendly bids due to the disciplinary nature of hostile bids or due 
to overpayment for the target firm (Limmack 1993): 
H3 The pre bid performance of targets in hostile bids is worse than the pre bid 
performance of targets in friendly bids   
Takeover bids are also distinguished based on outcome of the bid (Bishop, Dodd 
and Officer 1987). Takeover bids involve behind the scenes negotiations between the 
managers of the bidding firm and that of the target firm. Bid outcome is defined as 
successful or lapsed bid. Successful bids are those bids that are concluded within the 
twelve-month period from the date of announcement. Lapsed bids are bids that are not 
concluded within twelve months from the date of announcement. At the same time, 
targets that survive takeover bids should exhibit improvements in corporate performance 
after the failure of the bid. 
H4 The pre bid performance of targets in completed bids is worse than the pre bid 
performance of targets in lapsed bids 
 H5 The post bid performance of bidders in failed bids is worse than the post bid 
performance of targets that survive takeover bids 
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2.5 REVIEW OF MARKET BASED EVIDENCE 
Stock market data has been used to evaluate the performance of mergers to assess 
the abnormal returns gained by the shareholders of the merging firms (Jensen and 
Ruback, 1983).  
2.5.1 PRE BID SHARE PRICE PERFORMANCE 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) reported that acquiring firms earn positive abnormal 
returns prior to a takeover bid and that acquired firms may suffer poor returns in this 
same period. They found that acquisitions are undertaken by the more efficient 
companies and those acquisitions involve redeployment of capital to the more profitable 
firms. US studies report losses in the period prior to acquisitions (Langetieg 1978; Dodd 
1980; Hubbard and Palia 1995 and Harford 1999). In the UK, most studies report that 
acquiring firms earned negative returns in the period prior to takeover bids (Firth 1979, 
1980; Dodd and Quek 1985; Limmack 1991; and Sudarsanam et al., 1996). These studies 
also reported that acquired firms earn positive returns in the same period when acquiring 
firms make losses.   
Morck et al., (1988) report that poor performance leads to a takeover bid while 
Palepu (1986) finds no evidence of significant under performance. Morck et al., (1989) 
found that takeover bids are common in declining industries. 
Mandelker (1974) examined mergers between NYSE bidders and targets for the 
period 1941 to 1962 by measuring stock return performance relative to the security 
market line. He found a cumulative abnormal return of –3% for targets over months (-40, 
-9) relative to the month of the merger completion. 
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Ellert (1976) examined the performance of merging firms in the period 1950-1970. 
He calculated the cumulative average abnormal return, using the 2-factor market model, 
and found that the CAR -11.7% for target firms over months (–100, -8) around the 
merger completion.  
Dodd and Ruback (1977) tested the inefficient management hypothesis by 
examining the effect of corporate acquisitions on stockholder returns. They examined 136 
successful tender offers during the period 1958 to 1976 using the market model and they 
found out that in the months (-12, -3) abnormal returns are positive.   
Langetieg (1978) examined return performance 72 months before the merger 
completion for the period 1929 to 1969 and found that the firm’s pre-merger performance 
was not significantly different from zero.   
Asquith (1983) examined 211 firms acquired over the period from 1962 to 1976.  
After adjusting for beta using the daily CRSP excess return file, he found that the 
cumulative abnormal return of these firms was – 14.8% over days (-480, -60) around the 
announcement.    
Malatesta (1983) examined 85 merger targets between 1969 and 1974 involving 
acquisitions of at least $10million.  The cumulative abnormal return of the target firms, 
calculated using the market model, over months (-60, -25) relative to the announcement 
was a statistically significant at 12.6%.  He also found that the cumulative abnormal 
return over months (-60, -3) was 4.9%.  These returns are inconsistent with that predicted 
by the inefficient management hypothesis.  
Martin and McConnell (1991) examined 253 tender offer targets over the period 
from 1958 to 1984.  They used the market model to measure abnormal performance. 
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They found that over months (-48, -3) around the announcement, the cumulative 
abnormal return was insignificantly different from zero. They however found that pre-
takeover returns are significantly lower for firms where managers are replaced following 
the tender offer than for firms where managers are not replaced.  Martin and McConnell 
conclude that the data they examined supports the hypothesis that takeovers are a device 
for disciplining the top managers of poorly performing firms.    
Agrawal and Jaffe (1995) examined 132 mergers between NYSE acquirers and 
NYSE targets over the period from 1941 to 1961.  They found that the cumulative 
abnormal return of targets over months (-60, -13) relative to the month of merger 
announcement was insignificantly different from zero.    
Kini, Kracaw and Mian (1995) examined 244 successful tender offers over the 
period from 1958 to 1984 based on the market model.  They found that the cumulative 
abnormal return over months (-48, -3) around the announcement was 2.44%. These 
results are not consistent with those predicted by the inefficient management hypothesis.   
 Franks and Mayer (1996) examined 33 successful hostile takeovers in the UK that 
were first announced during 1985 and 1986.  They found that the abnormal return for this 
sample in the five years before the announcement was insignificantly different from the 
abnormal performance of a non-merging control group matched on size and industry. In 
their view, they found that hostile takeovers performed a disciplinary role. 
Mitchell and Lehn (1990) examined 1,158 public corporations and they found that 
firms making bad acquisitions, as measured by announcement period abnormal returns, 
were more likely to be subsequently acquired than firms making good acquisitions are.  
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The authors supported the inefficient management hypothesis confirming that firms 
making a bad corporate decision were targets for takeover bids. 
  Palepu (1986) developed a model for predicting acquisition targets.  Using a 
sample of 163 firms that were acquired from 1971 to 1979, he found that the likelihood 
of takeover was negatively related to a firm’s abnormal stock return.   
  Asquith (1983) reported that target firm’s residuals declined, on average, while 
bidding firm’s residuals increase on average prior to the announcement date for the 
period (-48, -20) days. In his view this was consistent with the hypothesis that 
acquisitions transfer resources from inefficient to efficient firms. 
 Schipper and Thompson (1983) found that firms announcing acquisition programs 
experienced positive abnormal returns beginning about 30 months before the 
announcements of the program.  The cumulative abnormal return from month (-24) 
through to the announcement of the acquisition was over 20%  
Magenheim and Mueller (1988) examined a sample of 78 acquiring firms and 
found significant positive gains being earned in the two years prior to the announcement 
month.  Over the time interval of (-24, -4) months preceding the event, acquiring firms 
earn significant positive returns of 18.4% in excess of the expected returns based on their 
performance over the period (-60, -25) months.   
 Kennedy and Limmack (1996) report that target companies earned significant 
negative returns in years two (-24, -13) and years five (-60, -49) prior to the bid.  
Acquiring firms obtained significant positive excess returns for the whole period 
commencing 60 months before the bid month, consistent with the hypothesis that 
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companies undertake acquisitions during period of relatively good performance and that 
the takeover acts as a disciplinary mechanism on inefficiently performing targets.   
Firth (1979) found that 58% of acquired firms earn slightly negative returns of -
1.5%) in the 36 month period ending 12 months before the bid. Franks, Broyles and 
Hecht (1977) reported that targets earned negative returns of -10.0% relative to the 
industry index between months -40 and -15 from the announcement date.  The results are 
consistent with the view that acquired firms had poor performance prior to acquisition.   
Firth (1980) found no evidence that acquired firms exhibited poor performance 
four years prior to the bid. Franks and Harris (1989) investigated shareholder wealth 
effects of UK takeovers in the period 1955-1985.  They reported that bidding firms 
exhibited good performance prior to the acquisition.  
Limmack (1991) examined the distribution of returns to shareholders of UK 
companies during the period 1977-1986. He found significant positive returns to bidders 
in the months prior to the formal announcement of the bid. The positive pre bid abnormal 
return to bidders supported the hypothesis that companies undertake acquisitions during 
period of good performance. 
Dodd (1997) reported that targets achieve a mean of 25% abnormal returns in the 
month of announcement. Anderson et al., (1994) report that smaller target firms achieve a 
higher abnormal return prior to a takeover bid.  
Bishop (1991) and Aitken and Czernkowski (1992) reported that target firm’s 
shares are re-valued upwards on disclosure of a substantial shareholding by prospective 
bidders. The revaluation is the result of the market assessment due to the pending 
takeover offer rather than a re-assessment of the underlying value of the target firm. 
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These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that firms experience abnormally good 
performance and have excess funds, which enable those companies to invest in other 
companies through the takeover mechanism. 
Bugeja and Walter (1995) examined the relationship between the abnormal 
returns accruing to target firm and pre bid performance. They reported that there is no 
relationship when share prices performance is used to measure corporate performance.  
McDougall and Round (1986) examined the pre acquisition accounting 
performance of acquiring firms in 88 takeovers that occurred between 1970 and 1981 in 
the retails, transport and industrial sectors. They report that acquiring firms exhibit higher 
profit levels than their targets.  
Avkiran (1999) found that acquiring banks in Australia were more efficient than 
their targets in the pre acquisition period. Eddey and Taylor (1999) report that targets 
under perform in the period prior to a takeover bid. They contend those targets in hostile 
bids use accrual accounting to increase current earnings with a view to support their 
claim that the bid, relative to earnings, is inadequate and that targets in friendly bids use 
accrual accounting to decrease current earnings.  
2.5.2 POST BID SHARE PRICE PERFORMANCE 
  Magenheim and Mueller (1988) suggested that in assessing the consequences of 
acquisition for acquiring firms it would be appropriate to look at the longer-run 
perspective of the firms. Accordingly, the next focus is the literature review on the post 
acquisition performance of bidders and targets after failed bids.  
 Generally, studies of share price post acquisition performance in the US and UK   
appear to produce consistent results, which indicate that acquisitions are detrimental to 
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shareholders of bidding firms.  In summarizing US studies prior to 1980, Jensen and 
Ruback  (1983) indicates that post acquisition share-price performance of acquiring firms 
averages abnormal returns of -5.5% during the twelfth month after acquisition.  Jensen 
and Ruback (1983, p.20) interpret these negative post acquisition returns as ‘unsettling 
because they are inconsistent with market efficiency and suggest that changes in share 
prices during acquisitions overestimate the future efficiency gains from acquisitions’. 
Post acquisition share price performance in Australia also suggests that acquiring 
companies exhibit underperformance consistent with the hubris hypothesis of takeovers 
(Walter 1984; Casey, Dodd and Dolan 1987). Walter (1984) examined the weekly returns 
to Australian bidders in completed takeovers and found that bidders experienced a 
cumulative average abnormal return of 28% over the period (-100, 0) weeks relative to 
the week of announcement. However, he also found that in the period –1, + 1 weeks the 
average cumulative abnormal return declined by 1.3%  
Casey, Dodd and Dolan (1987) examine takeovers, which occurred between 1981 
and 1986, and they report that the cumulative abnormal return declines to –2.42% in the 
two-day announcement window and –5.99% in the 15-day window. Brown and da Silva 
Rosa (1998) examine 655 takeover bids and report that the mean abnormal return of 
acquiring companies of 55 is earned over a seven month period 
Walter (1984) and Bishop, Dodd and Officer (1987) also report on the share price 
performance in failed bids. Walter (1984) examined 97 unsuccessful bids for the period 
1966 to 1972 and found out that they earned a 3.2% abnormal return in the period –1 
week prior to the announcement of the bid. Bishop et al., (1987) reported that 
unsuccessful bidders experienced large positive abnormal returns. 
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2.6 REVIEW OF ACCOUNTING EVIDENCE  
2.6.1 OPERATING PERFORMANCE PRIOR TO TAKEOVER BIDS 
  Singh (1971) examined the pre acquisition characteristics of acquired firms and 
compared them with those of the surviving firms. Using both single and multivariate 
statistical analysis, he found that acquired firms tended to have low profitability, low 
growth and low valuation ratios when compared with non-acquired firms. Singh also 
reported that the acquiring firms were significantly more profitable than the acquired 
firms but with similar profitability to non-acquiring firms.  
Singh (1975) reported that the unprofitable firms taken over were smaller. The 
takeover process was therefore seen to provide a measure of discipline for less profitable 
smaller firms but not for large firms.  Singh argued that firms could reduce their 
probability of being taken over by increasing their relative size without increasing their 
rate of profit.  His view was that the takeover mechanism encouraged large relatively 
unprofitable firms to increase their size by acquiring other companies. 
 Meeks (1977) carried a similar study that examined the pre acquisition 
characteristics of 233 acquiring and acquired firms during the period 1964-1972. Meeks 
found that the acquiring firms are significantly bigger than the acquired firms and that the 
profitability of the acquiring firms are higher than their industry average for each of the 
three years prior to the acquisition.  However, the profitability of acquired firms was no 
better when compared to their industry average over the same period. 
 Cosh, Hughes and Singh (1980) examined the financial characteristics of bidders 
and targets and found out that there was little difference in the average in the pre bid 
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profitability of acquiring and acquired firms.  They authors concluded that takeovers may 
not be an effective mechanism for resource allocation. 
 Holl and Pickering (1988) analyzed the financial performance of 282 UK firms 
over the period 1965-76 and reported that target companies were less profitable than their 
bidders and less profitable than target companies in failed bids. Holl and Pickering 
findings are consistent with the hypothesis that firms that do not perform well will be 
taken over.  
Taffler and Holl (1991) examined the financial performance of 55 cases of 
abandoned acquisitions in UK during the period 1977-81. They found that bidders were 
no more profitable than their targets either in successful or abandoned bids.  Neither did 
the targets in abandoned bids exhibit superior pr bid profitability performance to targets 
in completed bids.  
 Mueller (1980) examined 287 companies that were acquired over the period 
1962-72. He found that the acquired companies had slightly higher pre-acquisition 
returns on assets than non-merging control groups, and nearly a percentage point higher 
than the average return in their home industries.  He also reported that there was no 
difference in profitability of acquiring firms and that of acquired companies in the year 
before acquisition.   
Palepu (1986) examined a sample of 163 targets and 256 non-targets in US during 
the period 1971-1979. He argued that only average excess returns, growth-resource 
variables and size variables give significant results.  The results indicate that poorer share 
market performance and smaller size are likely to increase a firm’s probability of 
becoming a target.  Further, firms with mismatch between growth and resources, that is, 
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low-growth, resource-rich firms (high liquidity and low leverage) and high-growth, 
resource-poor firms (low liquidity and high leverage) are more likely acquisition 
candidates.  Palepu also provide evidence that the prediction models are not superior to 
that of the stock market in predicting acquisition targets as claimed by earlier studies. 
 Powell (1997) document that the larger the firm’s size, the lower the firm’s 
liquidity, the lower the firm’s profitability and the higher the firm’s market-to-book 
ratios, the higher the likelihood of a hostile takeover of a firm for the period 1984-91.  On 
the other hand, the likelihood of a friendly takeover is higher when the firm is smaller 
and leverage higher.  Powell’s results indicate that inefficient management and target 
under valuation hypothesis are more likely to be prevalent in hostile takeovers. 
 Hay and Liu (1998) provide evidence that acquiring firms with high profit rate, 
generating increasing cash flow and enjoying rising valuation ratios are more likely to 
make acquisitions.  These authors examined the behavior of 110 UK manufacturing firms 
during the period 1981 to 1989. They found a positive coefficient on profit rate (gross 
post tax operating rates excluding depreciation and interest payments) and negative 
coefficients on debt/asset ratio, of 0.499 and –1.04, respectively.  The results indicate that 
a firm with high forecast of cash flow and low debt/asset ratio are more likely to make 
acquisitions, consistent with Jensen’s (1986) cash flow theory that excess cash flows in 
the hands of management which are not needed to pay debt interest or dividend to 
shareholders are used to make acquisitions.  A positive coefficient on the valuation ratio 
(market value) also indicates that investors are confident in the acquiring firms’ 
management and likely to be favorable to the acquired firms’ shareholders when the bid 
is made. 
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 Mikkelson and Partch (1997) examined the relation between managerial turnover 
and performance of 200 US companies during an active takeover market (1984-1988) and 
a less active takeover market (1989-1993).  They found that there are significantly higher 
frequencies of turnover among the lowest quartile of performers (measured by operating 
income scaled by assets) in the more active takeover period.  The rate of complete 
turnover of top management among the highest quartile of performers 33%, more than 
double the turnover rate among the lowest quartile of performers (16%) in the active 
takeover years.  In the less active takeover period, the rate of complete turnover is 17% in 
the lowest quartile of performers and there is no significant association between the rates 
of senior management turnover activity facilitates the replacement of managers of poorly 
performing firms and that corporate manager’s face less pressure to maximize value 
when the takeover activity diminishes. 
2.6.2 POST BID OPERATING PERFORMANCE 
A number of studies have examined the post acquisition performance of the 
combined firm to identify whether or not corporate acquisitions provide long-run 
economic benefits (Meeks and Meeks, 1981; Loderer and Martin, 1992).  An assessment 
of the company performance is possible either by comparing the post acquisition profits 
of the target and bidding companies over a pre acquisition period with consolidated 
profits over a post acquisition period, or by comparison between merged and non-
merging companies over the same period, in order to eliminate economic factors which 
would affect general profitability.  
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Lorie and Halpern (1970) found that merger active firms perform significantly 
better than less merger active or non-merging firms.  Healy et al., (1992) and Jarrell 
(1995) found significant increases in post acquisition performance of the merged firms.   
Ghosh (1998) also reported an improvement in post acquisition for merging firms.  
UK studies suggest that on average accounting performance of the acquiring companies 
were disappointing (Singh, 1971, Utton, 1974, Meeks, 1977 and Dickerson, Gibson and 
Tsakalotos, 1997). 
Other studies (Cosh et al., 1980; Holl and Pickering 1988; and Manson, Powell, 
Stark and Thomas, 2000) show that acquiring firm profitability either increased, or 
remained the same following acquisition. 
Mueller (1980) reported that the pre-tax profit rates (either on assets, sales or 
equity) of the combined firms relative to their industries were found to be lower after 
acquisition than before for all three-profit measures, indicating deterioration in the 
operating performance of the combined firms.  Mueller (1980) also found declines in the 
rates of return on the acquiring companies’ shares over the period of acquisition and three 
subsequent years, which further strengthen the conclusion that acquisitions are not 
beneficial to the acquiring firms. 
 Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987) found that target firms were statistically more 
profitable, 8.18% higher than the industry average over all three years prior to 
acquisition.  They measured profitability as the ratio of annual operating income to total 
end-of-period assets.  By contrast, the acquiring firms who had acquired profitable target 
firms did not fare very well after acquisition.  Over the three years 1975-77, the acquiring 
firms post acquisition profits was barely above that of the control group, and even in the 
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best year 1977, it was much lower than the average target unit’s pre acquisition level.  
Their results provide evidence that merging firms are usually less profitable than their 
non-merging counterparts and produces evidence that contradicts the theory of takeovers 
as an efficiency-increasing mechanism. 
 Philippatos and Baird (1996) examined firms with high performance making 
value-increasing acquisitions found that the change in the combined firms’ excess value 
of sales is negatively correlated with the acquiring firm’s pre acquisition performance. 
They found that the mean and median in the combined firms’ change in value are 
insignificantly positive. They also reported that acquisitions by well performing acquirers 
that does not show any improvements in their post acquisition performance may be 
driven by hubris and acquisitions of poorly performing firms may be viewed as a means 
of mitigating the factors that relegate them to undesirable competitive positions. 
Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987) reported that firms involved in acquisitions on average 
do not exhibit improvement in their post acquisition performance.  
Singh (1971) reported that acquiring firms had better performance records than 
target firms prior to the bid.  In analysing the profitability of the acquiring firms after 
takeover Singh (1971) found that in a majority of cases the profitability of the acquiring 
firms decline in the year of takeover through 2 years after takeover.  Their view was that 
the results from their study suggested that it was very unlikely that the takeover process 
would lead to a more profitable utilisation of the existing assets of the firms.  
Utton (1974) compared the profitability of 39 companies that were classified as 
intensive acquirers with that of a group of companies that grew through internal 
expansion, using the reported pre-tax profit as a percentage of net assets as a measure of 
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profitability. Their results showed that over the periods 1961-65 and 1966-70, the average 
profitability of the takeover intensive sample was lower than that of the internal-growth 
group.  The average profitability of the takeover intensive firms fell from 13.6% to 11.5% 
and the control group from 15.4% to 14.2%.  Similarly there was no indication that the 
takeover intensive firms have performed significantly better than the industry average 
firms. However, Utton (1974) used an unadjusted pre-tax profit performance, which 
could contribute to the bias in these results.  
Meeks, 1977 and Cosh et al., (1980, 1989) compared post acquisition profit of the 
combined firms with their weighted average pre acquisition profitability, either relative to 
their industry average or to size and industry-matched non takeover firms. Meeks 
compared profitability in the year of the takeover and the following seven years, with that 
of the weighted-average profitability of the firms in the three years prior to the takeover 
after adjusting the firm’s profit relative to its industry. He found that on average 
profitability showed a significant decline for the five years following the acquisition from 
the pre acquisition level, suggesting that acquisitions have a negative effect on 
profitability.  Cosh et al. (1980) also found that the net income on net assets of the 
combined firms decline on average by a significant 0.25% three years after acquisition 
compared with five years before acquisition.   
In a study which compared the performance of companies involved in successful 
and failed bids, Holl and Pickering (1988) showed that the target and bidding companies 
that did not merge have better profitability than those that did merge for 3 years 
following acquisition.  Their results suggest that the target and bidding companies that 
did not merge had better profitability than those that did merge for 3 years following 
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acquisition.  They reported that target and bidding companies in failed bids obtained a 
significantly higher return on capital employed (4.3%) and return on equity (2.7%) than 
the target and bidding companies in successful acquisitions.  Holl and Pickering (1988) 
also find that target companies in failed acquisition have significant higher growth rate, 
higher return on capital employed, and higher return on equity and retention ratio over 
the 3 years following the acquisition bid compared to 3 years before the bid.  While their 
results indicate that acquisition does not seem to have a favorable effect on relative 
performance of the merged firms, the results suggested that the threat of takeover might 
have been a spur to efficiency improvement on the part of a target company not taken 
over. 
Dickerson et al., (1997) analyzed the impact of acquisition on profitability of 
2,941 UK quoted companies during the period 1948-77 and found that the mean rate of 
return on assets (pre-tax profit as a proportion of average net assets) of acquirers was 
significantly negative and 2.4% below that of non-acquirers.  They also found that on 
average profitability increased by almost 6.9% in the long run through internal growth 
relative to only 0.2% by acquisition growth.  Thus, their results are consistent with 
previous studies above that suggest that acquisition has a negative long-term effect on 
company performance as measured by profitability. 
Mc Dougall et al., (1986) study reported that bidders achieve higher profits than 
targets in the period prior to a takeover bid. However, they also reported that the post 
acquisition operating performance of merging firms is lower than pre acquisition 
operating performance.  
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Sharma and Ho (2002) examined 36 acquisitions that took place between 1986 
and 1991 and they found that corporations did not lead to significant post acquisition 
improvements in operating performance. 
Hyde (2002) examined mergers in the petroleum industry and found out that 
combined firms exhibit decreases in profitability and increases in inefficiency in the 
period after takeovers in comparison to the pre acquisition period. 
2.7 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The objective of this chapter was to review literature on the impact of takeovers 
on corporate performance. The chapter discussed some of the reported motives and the 
classification of takeover bids in financial literature. Managers of target firms are faced 
with the takeover threat if they under perform. The threat of a takeover is termed as a 
kick in the pants that seeks to encourage managers of the target firm to revise their 
policies and improve performance. However, takeovers send mixed signals. An ideal 
takeover therefore is one that is undertaken for synergistic reasons and the disciplining of 
inept and inefficient management. According to the welfare theory, all parties to the 
takeover are bound to benefit from this transaction. Acquiring and target firm 
shareholders benefit from takeovers when then realize higher returns from their 
investment after a takeover bid. The management of the acquiring firms benefits from 
successful takeover bids as these results in exerting control over a larger asset base and 
continued employment. Target firm managers also benefit from takeovers in form of 
golden handshake. In the end an ideal takeovers is one that makes acquiring firm’s 
shareholders better off and one that ensures shareholders’ interests take precedence over 
those of management.  
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On the other hand, acquiring firm shareholders stand to lose from the takeover 
transaction if acquiring firm management is overly optimistic about the perceived 
benefits from the takeover. There are different motives for takeover activity and some of 
them are not be driven by the desire to maximize shareholder wealth. Such takeovers are 
meant to maximize acquiring firm management at the expense of shareholders.   
The different motives of takeovers arise because of conflicting theories of the 
firm. The traditional theory of the firm demands that shareholder wealth should be 
maximized so that shareholders get value from their investment. However, due to the 
complexities that arise from the existence of large corporations, ownership is separate 
from control such that managers make decisions that will ensure the firm survives into 
the unforeseeable future. To achieve this objective managers pursue corporate growth, 
increased market share, maximize share value, extract higher fees, minimize costs, 
management replacement and other similar objectives.  
Takeovers are a means that enables a firm to achieve growth rapidly, especially in 
new or difficult markets without having to compete with existing firms in those markets. 
Takeovers are also a means of improving the level of efficiency in the combined firm. 
Finally, this chapter defines the direction this study is taking, that is, to examine to 
whether takeovers in the UK are disciplinary.  In this respect, this study seeks to examine 
to whether shareholder wealth is maximized following acquisition of poorly performing 
and inefficiently managed firms. 
The review of evidence suggest that takeovers in general, are benefit target firm 
shareholders but, accounting evidence suggest that acquisitions are not profitable in the 
end. The review of evidence is inconsistent with the view that takeovers are a mechanism 
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for transferring assets to their most productive use (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The 
review of evidence is also inconsistent with the view that takeovers benefit shareholders 
of the acquiring the firm in form of increased future profits, which arise from gains 
arising from synergy and replacement of inefficient managers of target firms.  
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CHAPTER 3 
SAMPLE DESCRIPTION AND METHODOLOGY 
3.1 CHAPTER OBJECTIVE 
The objective of this chapter is to describe data, sources of the data and the 
research methodologies adopted in this study to examine the hypothesis that takeovers 
perform a disciplinary function over poorly performing firms. Shareholder wealth is 
measured by share prices (Ibbotson, 1975). This study examines the abnormal share price 
return and the cumulative abnormal return in different event windows, and evaluates 
operating performance prior to and after the takeover bid. 
3.2 DESCRIPTION OF DATA AND SAMPLE SELECTION 
 
This section describes data sources and sample selection for companies involved 
in takeover bids in the United Kingdom in the period between 1 January 1990 and 31 
December 1997. The initial sample of 738 acquisitions of UK public companies by other 
UK public companies drawn from the Thomson Financial publication Acquisition 
Monthly editions for all takeover bids announced from 1 January 1990 to 31 December 
1997. The sample period is selected to focus on bids around the publication of the 
Cadbury Report 1992.  
For a bid to be included in the final sample, both the bidding and the target firms 
should be listed on the London Stock Exchange and share price data for the target firms 
should be available on the London Share Price Database. Details of the takeover bid 
include date of announcement, whether the bid is friendly or hostile, whether the bid is 
completed or has lapsed and whether the top management of the target firms voluntarily 
resign or are dismissed following the takeover are cross checked with news articles in the 
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financial press. The sample excludes all takeover bids made by foreign companies that 
are not listed at the London Stock Exchange and those firms whose share price data is not 
available on the London Share Price database. If a security does not have a minimum of 
60 months of return data surrounding its event date, it is excluded from the sample. Data 
for calculating operating performance should be available on data stream. Multi-bids for 
the same target by one bidder made in the same accounting period (one year) are 
excluded, only one bid is taken and should either be included in the list of completed or 
lapsed bids. However, where a target receives several bids from different companies, all 
bids will be included in the sample if they are lapsed bids. 
In this study, changes in the identity of top manager one year following the 
completion (or the lapse) of the bid are defined as disciplinary bids. The change in the 
position of top manager is documented after identifying the top manager of the target 
firm in the various editions of the London Stock Exchange Year Book, Directors and 
their companies for the period 1988 through to 1999. Evidence of routine and non-routine 
management changes in target firms was cross checked with data in the financial press 
most notably, the Lexis-Nexus website. 
The second sub-sample is concerned with friendly and hostile bids. Hostile 
takeovers are associated with disciplinary takeovers, because of the assumption that 
resistance to the bid might not be in the interest of shareholders if the incumbent 
managers are threatened with post bid managerial changes in the combined firm.   
The third sub-sample examines the performance of targets in completed bids and 
targets in lapsed bids. Completed bids are those that are acquired within twelve months of 
the date of announcement. Takeover literature suggests that targets of a takeover bid 
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under perform prior to a takeover bid. Completed bids are perceived to be disciplinary if 
corporate control changes following the completion of a takeover bid.  All bids not 
concluded within twelve months of the date of announcement are lapsed bids. 
Table 3.1 is a list of take over bids that make the final data set for evaluating share 
price and operating performance. The total number of bids for the period 1990 to 1997 is 
738. Some bids have been excluded from the final data set due to not meeting the 
conditions specified above. The final data set is composed of 153 take over bids, 
classified into completed, lapsed, friendly, hostile, disciplinary and non disciplinary bids. 
The amount involved in the 153 takeover bids is huge. The total value is £39.7 billion.  
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Table 3.1 Classification of takeover bids 
Period All 
bids 
Completed Lapsed Top 
Management 
Change 
No Top 
Management 
Change 
Friendly Hostile
1990 105 99 6 15 90 84 21 
1991 104 89 15 9 95 87 17 
1992 58 52 6 4 54 51 7 
1993 62 51 11 11 51 51 11 
1994 77 71 6 9 68 63 14 
1995 104 88 15 11 92 85 18 
1996 95 81 14 9 86 74 21 
1997 134 119 15 30 104 122 12 
Total 738 650 88 98 640 617 121 
Less 
other 
bids 
 
 
585 
 
 
516 
 
 
69 
 
 
54 
 
 
531 
 
 
496 
 
 
89 
 
Final 
data set 
 
 
153 
 
 
134 
 
 
19 
 
 
44 
 
 
109 
 
 
121 
 
 
32 
 
Since a takeover bid is perceived to be a court of last resort, that is an aid where 
internal controls are weak or are failing, the publication of the Cadbury Report in 1992 
was seen as a move towards strengthening corporate governance for UK companies. 
Table 3.2 shows the frequency distribution of the 738 takeover bids in the pre Cadbury 
Report and post Cadbury Report periods. There were more takeover bids after the 
publication of the Cadbury Report (409 bids) than before (329), based on the cutoff 
period of 1993 when the Cadbury Report was prescriptive for all UK listed companies. 
The increase in number of bids can be attributed to more awareness to use the market for 
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corporate control by firms and may also suggest that weakness in internal control and 
indecisive board controls are still very weak. 
Table 3.2 Frequency Distribution of Takeover Bids Relative to the Cadbury Report 
Publication 
Period All 
bids 
Completed Lapsed Top 
Management 
Change 
No Top 
Management 
Change 
Friendly Hostile
1990 105 99 6 15 90 84 21 
1991 104 89 15 9 95 87 17 
1992 58 52 6 4 54 51 7 
1993 62 51 11 11 51 51 11 
Pre 
Cadbury 
Report 
 
 
329 
 
 
291 
 
 
38 
 
 
39 
 
 
290 
 
 
273 
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1994 77 71 6 9 68 63 14 
1995 103 88 15 11 92 85 18 
1996 95 81 14 9 86 74 21 
1997 134 119 15 30 104 122 12 
Post 
Cadbury 
Report 
 
 
409 
 
 
359 
 
 
50 
 
 
59 
 
 
350 
 
 
344 
 
 
65 
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3.3 EVENT STUDY METHODOLOGY  
Share price performance examined using the event study approach in takeovers 
(Halpern, 1983). The stock price reaction to the announcement of takeovers is examined 
using the standard event study methodology of Brown and Warner (1980) to compute 
monthly excess returns Average monthly returns are computed using a two-step 
procedure and stock price data from London Business School Database (LBSD). The 
market portfolio proxy is the Financial Times All share Index.  
The parameters of a single factor market model for each firm are estimated using 
the returns for the months –72 to –13 to estimate each firm’s alpha and beta coefficient. 
The monthly returns are computed for the period –1 month to + 1 month where month 0 
is the announcement month of the takeover. The Secondly, the excess return are 
computed by subtracting a firm’s expected monthly return from its actual return. 
Cumulative abnormal returns are calculated by summing the abnormal returns over the 
period – 1 month to + 1 month.  
Thirdly, the relationship between the stock price reaction and firm variables is 
examined using cross sectional regressions. Cumulative abnormal returns are regressed 
against the method of payment, firm size and free cash flow. The method of payment 
variable is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the bidder offers cash to acquire stock or 0 
otherwise. Travlos (1987) finds stock price reactions of bidding firms to the 
announcement of a takeover related to the method of payment. The reaction is more for 
an acquisition paid with stock as it signals that the bidder is over valued. Loughran and 
Vijh (1997) finds that firms that pay for a merger with stock have significantly poor 
returns during the five years following the acquisition, while firms that make purchases 
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with cash have positive excess returns. It is expected that a positive coefficient should be 
found for this variable.    
This study adopts the Fama, et al., (1969) event study methodology to calculate 
cumulative abnormal returns for the 24-month period around the date of announcement. 
The abnormal returns are estimated using the market model, and market-adjusted model, 
where the benchmark return is the return on the Financial Times All Share Index. The t-
statistics are estimated using the cross-sectional variation of abnormal returns.  
The procedure starts with estimating the parameters of a single factor market 
model for each firm. The returns used to estimate each firm’s alpha and beta coefficient 
are from month –72 to month –13. The monthly returns are computed for the period –12 
to +12, where month 0 is the announcement of the takeover. Secondly, the abnormal 
return is computed by subtracting the firm’s expected monthly return from its actual 
return. Cumulative abnormal returns are calculated by summing the abnormal returns 
over the period month –12 through months +12.  
The relationship between the stock price reaction and firm variables is then 
examined using cross sectional regressions. Cumulative abnormal returns are observed in 
each of the following pre bid firm characteristics, mood of bid, bid outcome and top 
management change. A hostile bid is represented by a dummy variable of 1 and 0 
otherwise.  The change in the position of CEO represented by a dummy variable of 1 and 
0 if there is no change in the position of CEO. A dummy variable 1 represents a 
completed bid while 0 represents a failed bid.   
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The abnormal return, ARit, for firm i, and in the period, t, is the actual ex-post 
return of the security over the event window minus the expected return of the firm over 
the event window. For the firm, i, and the event period, t the abnormal return is: 
ARit  = Rit - E (Rit)             (3.1)  
Where,    
ARit  = abnormal return 
Rit  = actual return 
E (Rit)  = expected return respectively for time period t.  
Actual return =  (Pt + Dt-Pt-1/Pt-1) x 100% 
Where   
Pt  = security price in month t 
Dt  = dividends in month t 
Rit is the actual return measured during the event period and E (Rit) is the 
benchmark return expected in the absence of that event. In order to measure R share 
prices changes and dividends paid are calculated in the event period. Due to the influence 
of market wide events on the returns of securities, various models may predict the normal 
return. These models are assumed to provide unbiased predictor of the expected return. 
The expected return is adjusted by using the market return, which, for UK firms, is 
calculated from the Financial Times All Share Index (Dimson and Marsh, 1986) The 
Financial Times All Share index is a value weighted index. The model for generating 
expected returns therefore follows the equation: 
 
E (Rit)  = αi + β*rmi                (3.2)  
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Where  
αi  =  constant of security, i estimated from the pre-event measurement       
period 
βi  =  beta of security, i estimated from the pre-event measurement 
period  
Rmt   =  total return of market from the Financial Times All Share Index, in 
period t 
 
3.4 MODELS FOR GENERATING NORMAL RETURNS 
A security’s price performance can only be considered abnormal when it is 
compared with a particular benchmark. The normal return on a share is that expected 
return on that share, which we would derive if the economic event under study did not 
take place. After comparing the actual return during the event period with the expected 
‘normal’ return, there will abnormal performance if the actual share price is greater or 
smaller than the expected return. There are various models for generating normal returns. 
For each model, the abnormal return for a given security in any time period t is defined as 
the difference between its actual ex post return and that which is predicted under the 
assumed return-generating process (Brown and Warner, 1980).  
3.4.1 THE MARKET MODEL  
The most widely used methodology to generate normal returns is the market 
model.  The market model is a statistical model, which relates the return of any given 
security to the return of the market portfolio. The market model measures the relationship 
between a security’s return and the return on the market. This model estimates the 
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relationship between a share’s returns and the returns on the market by ordinary least 
squares (OLS) regression and use this relationship to estimate expected returns, given 
returns on the market (Armitage, 1995; MacKinlay, 1997). Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll 
(1969) introduced this model and the equation for the market model is: 
Rit  =  αi +  βi *Rmt + ∈it             (3.3) 
Where 
Rit  =  total return of security i in period t 
αi  =  constant of security, i estimated from the pre-event    
             measurement period 
βi  =  beta of security i, estimated from the pre-event measurement period  
Rmt  =  total return of market in period t 
∈it  = the error term with the expected mean of zero.  
Rit is the actual return during t (a day or month) on company i’s share and Rmt is 
the share market index such as the UK’s Financial Times All-share Index, the American 
S & P Index as a proxy for the market.  (Rahman, 2000) reports that the model argues 
that the return on a firm is linearly related to the returns on the market portfolio, where α 
andβ are assumed constant over time.    
After calculating the estimates of α andβ, with data from the appropriate 
estimation period (Kothari and Warner, 1997) the expected return is given by inserting 
the estimated values of αi and βi, together with the actual return on the market. The 
abnormal return is derived from the following equation: 
ARit   =  Rit – (αi + βI* Rmt)                     (3.4) 
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The abnormal return will be positive if the takeover event is expected to create 
additional value for the shareholders. The abnormal return will be zero if the acquisition 
in neutral. Where the abnormal return is negative, it implies that the takeover does not 
create additional value for shareholders. If the takeover does not achieve the desired 
effect, to improve corporate performance, acquiring firm shareholders do not benefit 
from the takeover. The money paid to another firm could as well have been distributed to 
shareholders of the acquiring firm. Such takeovers that do not realize positive abnormal 
returns are carried out to benefit acquiring managers. The following logarithm 
transformation model was used by Fama et al., (1969) to determine when new 
information is anticipated by the share market and reflected on average in the prices of 
shares: 
Loge Rit = αi + βi loge Rmt + ∈it         (3.5) 
   The log of the market index relative (loge Rmt) is the rate of return on a 
portfolio of all securities in the market, and the log of the security price relative (Loge 
Rit) is the rate of return on an individual security. 
3.4.2 THE MARKET ADJUSTED RETURN MODEL (INDEX MODEL) 
The market adjusted return model is a variation of the market model whereby α = 
0 and β = 1. Under the market adjusted return model the expected return for firm j is not 
adjusted for risk. The market adjusted return model, also known as the zero-one model, 
assumes that over any period t, the asset, will earn the market rate of return, Rmt 
(Armitage 1995).   The equation for the market adjusted return model is: 
 
Rit     =   Rmt                             (3.6)                               
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Following equation (5) the abnormal return ARit, is the actual return, Rit less Rmt. 
 
 ARit     =  Rit – (0 + 1 (Rmt)                                          (3.7)                         
3.4.3 THE CONSTANT MEAN RETURN MODEL 
The constant mean return model, assumes that the ex ante expected return for a 
given security, i, is equal to a constant Ri which can differ across securities (Brown and 
Warner, 1980).  In this case, the predicted ex post return on security, i, in time period t is 
equal to Ri. 
Rit  =  Ri              (3.8) 
The abnormal return ∈it is equal to the difference between the observed return, 
Rit, and the expected predicted return Ri:  
∈it   =   Rit - Ri             (3.9) 
Where   
Rit is the return in period t return on security i 
∈it is the error term or abnormal return. 
3.4.4 CAPITAL ASSET PRICING MODEL AND THE ARBITRAGE PRICING 
MODEL 
Event studies have also used economic models to compute the abnormal return. 
Two common economic models used in finance are the Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(Sharpe, 1964) and the Arbitrage pricing Theory (Ross, 1976) 
The capital asset pricing model predicts the relationship between risk and returns 
and therefore provides a benchmark rate of return for evaluating investments. Financial 
theory posit that investors will hold risky assets if the rate of return of those assets is 
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greater than the return on the market portfolio. The market portfolio is the value of all the 
risky assets of an economy. 
The capital asset pricing model is an equilibrium theory where the expected return 
of a given asset is determined by its covariance with the market portfolio. The capital 
asset pricing model provides a measure of the risk of an individual security. The 
emphasis of the capital asset pricing model is that the intercept is the risk free rate, or the 
rate of return on the minimum variance zero-beta portfolio, which changes over time. 
This model is stated as: 
Ri  =  Rf + βi (Rm – Rf)       (3.10)  
Where    
Ri is the expected or ex ante return on the risky asset 
Rf is the rate of return on a risk-free asset 
Rm is the expected return on the market portfolio 
β is the systematic risk of the individual asset  
 The use of the capital asset pricing model has produced some deviations due to 
the restrictions it places on the market model and this has introduced the possibility that 
the results of these studies may be sensitive to the specific capital asset pricing model 
restrictions (Fama and French, 1995). The use of CAPM in measuring the normal returns 
in the 1970s is deemed to produce largely biased results and as such, it has ceased to be 
used as a measure determining normal returns. 
 Another economic theory similar to CAPM is the arbitrage pricing theory. The 
arbitrage pricing theory holds that the expected return of a financial asset can be modeled 
as a linear function of various macroeconomic factors, where sensitivity to changes in 
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each factor is represented by a factor specific beta coefficient (Ross, 1976). The rate 
derived from the model is then used to price the asset correctly such that the asset price 
should equal the expected price discounted at the rate implied by the model. If the price 
diverges, arbitrage should bring it back into line. The arbitrage-pricing model is stated as 
follows: 
E (ri)  = r f + βi 1 RP1+ βi 2 RP2 +…+β i n RP n     (3.11)  
Ri             = E (r i) + βi 1 F1+ βi 2 F2 +…+β i n F n + ∈j    (3.12) 
Where   
E (ri)  is the expected or ex ante return on the risky asset 
RPk       is the risk premium of the factor 
Fk             is the macroeconomic factor 
Rf  is the rate of return on a risk-free asset 
∈i  is the abnormal return with mean zero 
βik  is the sensitivity of the asset to factor k 
There are other models used to measure share price performance that include 
adjustments for specific characteristics such as industry and size variables (Franks, et. al., 
1977, 1991, Agrawal et al., 1992, Kennedy and Limmack, 1996 and Gregory, 1997). 
Franks et al., (1977) included and industry variable to the right side of the market model 
in their study of firms in the breweries and distilleries sector in order to control for 
specific industry effect. The model is written as follows: 
loge Rit = αi + βi loge Rmt + γ loge Rit ∈it      (3.13) 
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3.5 ABNORMAL PERFORMANCE 
 For each security, the event month, t = 0, is the month in which the takeover 
announcement was made public. The estimation period for generating normal returns is 
from –72 months, to, -13 months. The event period is from -12 months through to +12 
months. Abnormal returns are computed using equation 4.1 and the average abnormal 
returns for each firm for each month are aggregated during the test period as follows: 
 
ARit  =  1/n ARit        (3.14)  ∑
Where, 
n is the number of firms reporting returns 
Firms trading in the same period form an equally weighted portfolio, and this 
portfolio is treated as a single observation. The average abnormal returns accumulate 
over time to yield a cumulative average abnormal return over the test period:         
CAAR   =  ARt         (3.15) ∑
Where   CAAR is the summation of average abnormal returns in the period –12 to 
+12 months around the takeover bid 
3.6 STATISTICAL TESTING 
Abnormal returns are initially calculated on a security-by-security basis and then 
aggregated. The announcement dates for the various firms differ in calendar time but they 
all occur at event time t, = 0, in this study.  The abnormal returns for all securities for the 
time period t are aggregated, and the calculation of the average abnormal returns over all 
securities for that one period during the control period is as follows: 
 
 52
              N 
AAR   = 1/N ∑ Art       (3.16) 
               i =1 
 
The average abnormal return over all N securities for the control period is computed as 
follows: 
   t-s-1 
AARt   =  1/n-s ∑ Art                   (3.17) 
    t-n 
The average abnormal return over all securities during the control period provides 
us with the benchmark of the average abnormal return over all N securities for the whole 
period and the test period in particular. This benchmark forms our estimate of what is 
expected, on average, if no new information is forth coming to cause stock prices, and 
stock returns, to increase or decrease materially from their normal level. We compare this 
benchmark with the actual returns in the test period from –12, through to +12 months to 
determine if the takeover announcement is associated with higher or lower returns than 
expected. 
The abnormal returns are significant if they differ from what would be expected 
by chance and to see if they are, we must determine the standard deviation about the 
abnormal returns in the control period:             
(AARt) =
∑−−
−
−−−
1
2)^()1/1(
st
nt
AARAARtsn
)      (3.18) 
Where the abnormal return for the control period is determined using equation 4.10 and 
the average abnormal returns over the control period are given by equation 3.11. Testing 
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for significance for each average abnormal return in the test period we take the average 
abnormal return and divide it by the standard deviation determined in equation 3.13: 
Test statistic in the event period (using the Student’s t statistic):  
t-stat   = t/ S (AARt)            (3.19) 
The average test statistic for the cumulative abnormal returns in the event period is given 
by:  
t-stat   = AR/ S (AARt) n           (3.20) 
Where n is the number of months in the test period 
3.7 PITFALLS OF CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURN METHOD 
When evaluating share price performance for mergers and acquisitions, it is 
important to distinguish the performance of companies involved in takeover activity and 
those that are not. This is done to capture the effects of the takeover. In order to isolate 
the effect of the takeover on the performance of all companies, there is need to identify a 
suitable control. There are two notable methods to address this predicament. One method 
is to adopt a control firm so that every firm that has undergone a takeover, either as a 
target of acquirer, we would have assigned to it a similar firm that has not undergone a 
takeover (Dodd and Officer, 1980). However, finding a firm of similar size and similar 
other characteristics, is an un-surmountable problem. Dodd and Officer (1980, p. 361) 
suggest that  
‘A matching control is hazardous because of the difficulty in finding a correct matching 
firm, viz., the firm that could and should have grown by takeover but did not, but was 
identical to the firm involved in the takeover in all other respects’.  
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As a result, they recommend an alternative approach, which is, to form separate 
portfolios of bidding firms and target firms and then the performance of the portfolio that 
incorporates the market for all equities. In this study, the performance of firms involved 
in takeovers compared to the return on the market portfolio.  
Share price performance studies suffer from the lack of consensus on the most 
appropriate benchmark control and this makes it difficult to compare results across 
studies. Other problems arise from bias in what makes up the appropriate sample, and the 
aggregation of non-normal returns (Barber and Lyon, 1997 and Kothari and Warner, 
1997).  
Another problem with market studies is the lack of consistency as to how wide the 
event window should be. The date from which to measure the effect of the acquisition on 
shareholder returns varies from study to study. Jensen and Ruback (1983), report that 
measurement should relate to the timing of the acquisition news. The relevant 
information about an acquisition takes time to become public information, thereby 
making it difficult to measure the full impact of the acquisition.  An efficient market is 
assumed to adjust fully to the new information when an event occurs such as date of 
announcement. Unfortunately, news about acquisitions does not take the market by 
surprise because of its propensity to leaking before the official date of announcement. As 
a result, the wealth effects of the acquisition will be reflected in the share prices of the 
bidding and target firms around the announcement if the investors do not anticipate the 
event prior to the announcement date. Different studies therefore measure share price 
performance on different dates, some measure the effect of takeovers from the date of 
announcement (Dodd and Ruback, 1977, Schipper and Thompson, 1983, Malatesta, 1983 
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and Malatesta et al., 1988) while other studies measure the effect from the date of 
completion (Langetieg (1978). Other studies (Asquith, 1983) examine wealth changes 
from the date of announcement to the date the bid is concluded. On the other hand, 
Ruback (1988) argues that the analysis of security returns over longer periods after 
completion is indicative of a lack of confidence in the efficiency of the market reaction 
around the time of a takeover bid.  
3.8 OPERATING PERFORMANCE 
Prior to the advent of market-based studies of evaluating corporate performance, 
the stewardship of managers was evaluated by examining accounting results, notably the 
operating performance of companies prior to and post takeover (Chatterjee and Meeks, 
1996). This study evaluates the impact of takeovers by examining the profitability of 
bidders and targets in the period prior to and after the takeover bid.  
Barber and Lyon (1996) suggests that the study design for operating performance 
should follow an event study approach and follow methods similar to Brown and Warner 
(1985). This design involves three steps. Firstly, an appropriate measure of operating 
performance should be adopted.  Secondly, an expected operating performance model 
should be developed. The expected operating performance might be matching 
performance against control firms based on industry or size and industry, or based on the 
firms’ unadjusted past performance (Morck, Shleifer and Vishny 1988). Thirdly, the 
analysis is finalized by evaluating abnormal performance using parametric and non-
parametric test statistics. 
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3.8.1 PROFITABILITY  
Accounting performance measures the effect of mergers and acquisitions by 
examining the operating performance of combined firms before and after the takeover 
bid. Operating performance focuses profitability (See Meeks, 1977; Ravenscraft and 
Scherer, 1987; Singh, 1971, 1975; and Chatterjee, 1994). Profitability is defined as 
operating cash flow or, net income before interest and tax (EBIT). This net income profit 
is scaled by scaled by sales, or by market value or by total assets (Healy et al., 1992; 
Clark and Ofek, 1994).   
In order to examine whether there are improvements in the operating performance 
of companies involved in takeovers, in this study net income is scaled by the book value 
of total assets. Total assets are defined as the book value of shareholders funds and total 
debt less cash and marketable securities. Operating performance measures how well 
managers have used the assets of a business in order to create more wealth reflected by 
improvement in profitability. Managers exert control over operating and non-operating 
assets but excluding non-operating assets raises the question as to whether non-operating 
assets have no use in the operations of a firm. If they do not contribute anything, the 
question would be why they are maintained by the firm and not disposed of. While the 
classification of operating from non-operating assets may give different ratios of 
operating performance, the book value of shareholders funds and total debt, which 
represents fixed and current assets used in the creation of more wealth does not 
distinguish between operating and non-operating assets. 
Accounting performance for mergers and acquisitions in this study is determined 
by the following equation:  
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E OP (post)  = OP (B pre) + OP (T pre)                            (3.21) 
Where,  
E OP (post) is the expected post bid performance of the combined firms 
OP (B pre) is the pre acquisition performance of the bidder 
OP (T pre) is the pre acquisition performance of the target 
 
3.8.2 ALTERNATIVE DEFLATORS FOR MEASURING PROFITABILITY (TOTAL 
REVENUE AND MARKET VALUE OF ASSETS)  
 Previous studies have been critical of deflating operating performance with the 
book value of total assets because of number reasons such as questioning the use of 
depreciation in arriving at accounting profit and the weakness of the historical cost 
convention (Appleyard, 1980). Depreciation is viewed by others as an arbitrary figure, 
which is computed at different rates by different firms. Some compute depreciation using 
different rates as well as straight-line method or reducing balance method.  The objective 
of using transactions recorded at historical costs may suggest that accounting information 
is stale. In order to address these and other similar questions, Ghosh (2001) uses sales as 
an alternative deflator. The advantage of using sales is that it is a current measure where 
both the numerator and denominator of the return metric come from the same profit and 
loss account (Barber and Lyon, 1996; Powell and Stark, 2005). This study therefore 
measures operating performance by deflating earnings by revenue as an alternative to the 
total assets evaluation above.  
In order to address measurement problems associated with the book value of total 
assets since they are recorded at historical cost, the market value of the firms’ assets is 
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used as an alternative deflator such that operating performance is defined as earnings 
before interest scaled by the market value of total assets. Proponents of this measure 
suggest that book values should not be used as a deflator to earnings because earnings 
reflect current values where as total assets reflect book values. Powell and Stark (2005) 
measure operating performance as earnings before interest and tax scaled by market value 
of total assets as another alternative to scaling by book value of assets. Critics of this 
measure suggest that market values are arbitrary, are subject to speculation, prone to error 
because they depend on whether the market is efficient.     
The main measure of operating performance used in this study is earnings before 
interest and tax scaled by the book value of total assets. Earnings before interest and tax 
is defined as gross profit less selling and administration expenses but before deducting 
interest, depreciation and tax. This measure is similar to operating income before 
depreciation variable, which is used in the operating cash flow computation. The book 
value of total assets is the total value of assets derived from the company’s balance sheet. 
Interest, taxes and special items are excluded from the operating income because they can 
obscure operating performance. Secondly, operating income that excludes non operating 
expenses represent economic benefits generated by the firm and as a pre tax measure it is 
unaffected by changes in capital structure.  
Operating performance can be determined by industry or firm specific factors such 
as size and past profitability (Barber and Lyon, 1996). Most studies measure the effect of 
takeovers on performance by comparing the performance of bidding and target firms with 
control firms which neither made, nor received, a takeover offer for a public company 
during the three years before and after the acquisition and that had accounting data on 
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DataStream over this period. In this study we focus on the disciplinary effect of takeovers 
and hence, we compare the performance of sub-samples of firms involved in takeover 
bids but having a disciplinary effect with those firms that are not subject to a disciplinary 
bid. To be precise we compare pre and post takeover performance of firms in hostile and 
friendly bids, completed and lapsed bids, and, bids where there are or no top management 
changes after a takeover bid. 
3.9 DISTINGUISHING OPERATING CASH FLOW FROM EARNINGS 
A number of studies that evaluate corporate performance in mergers and 
acquisitions using accounting data choose operating cash flow over earnings as a measure 
of profitability. There are a number of reasons whereby operating cash flows are 
perceived to supersede earnings as a measure of profitability (Lawson, 1985). Barber and 
Lyon (1996) report that operating cash flow is a cleaner measure because while earnings 
include interest expenses, special items and taxes which can obscure operating 
performance, operating cash flow represent economic benefits generated by the firm’s 
assets.  The distinction between earnings and operating cash flow is that operating cash 
flow excludes non-cash transactions such as depreciation in the profit measure. 
Proponents of operating cash flows as a measure of profitability suggest that cash 
accounting provide reliable accounting information because profit is the net of actual 
inflows and outflows of cash. On the other hand, proponents of earnings as a measure of 
profitability argue that accounting information is derived from using accounting 
conventions, which assist in reporting the performance of firms. Profitability, defined as 
earnings before interest and tax is the measure used in this study to examine the impact of 
takeover bids.  
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Healy et al (1992) and Ghosh (2001) deflate operating profit by total market 
value, which is calculated as the sum of the market value of equity plus the book value of 
debt plus the book value of the preferred stock prior to and after the takeover. Total 
market value is used to take into account that it accurately reflects the productivity of the 
firm’s assets in generating economic benefits. While a market-based value is not affected 
by accounting policies market value is forward looking measure and as such, reflects not 
only the assets in place but also all assets the firm is expected to acquire (Healy, et. al., 
1992; Barber and Lyon, 1996; Powell and Stark, 2005). In efficient markets, abnormal 
returns represent the capitalized value of any post takeover performance improvements. 
This relies on the assumption of efficient markets to properly assess the gains arising 
from the takeover. The use of book value of assets is one way to overcome the above 
problem. Since the matter of interest in the pre-takeover operating performance of targets 
in disciplinary bids, in this study, operating profit is deflated by book value of assets and 
by total sales (Ghosh, 2001). The operating income deflated by total assets helps to 
control for differences in size across firms and for changes in asset base within the firms 
across the years.  
There are several other ways of measuring operating performance in accounting 
studies (Higson, 1990; Higson and Elliot, 1998). Some of the measures include deflating 
debt by total assets, total sales scaled by total assets as well comparing the book value of 
assets and its market value. Other studies deflate operating profit by operating assets or 
by equity (return on assets, return on equity). Another measure of analyzing operating 
performance is comparing the current ratio, defined as current assets scaled by current 
liabilities of one firm and that of another firm, or comparison for the same firm but in 
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different accounting periods. This ratio measures how well a firm is able to meet its 
current obligations. While these ratios may explain more about the characteristics of the 
firm, profitability ratio is undoubtedly the most common measure that is used by most 
firms to report accounting performance and upon which various stakeholders place 
reliance. 
3.10 ALTERNATIVE BENCHMARK RETURNS 
3.10.1 INDUSTRY ADJUSTED OPERATING PERFORMANCE MODEL 
The pre bid operating performance benchmark is described in literature as 
unsatisfactory for a number or reasons. First, it fails to control for intervening 
macroeconomic developments and introduces potentially significant measurement error 
(Jarrell 1995; Barber and Lyon 1996). Secondly, the level of pre acquisition operating 
performance might be higher and company performance might be a function of firm size 
The second approach employs the post acquisition performance of the combined 
firm’s industry as the performance benchmark, which provides that if the acquisition has 
no effect; the combined would perform as the non-combined firms in the same industry 
(Healy et al., 1992).  The industry-adjusted benchmark is the mean (or median) operating 
performance of all firms with the same data stream industry code, which is then 
subtracted from the sample firm’s operating performance to obtain the abnormal 
performance. The model is stated as follows: 
E OP (post) = OP (I) post                                 (3.22)   
Where 
EOP (Post) post is the expected performance of combined firms after the takeover bid,  
OP (I) post is the mean (median) operating performance of the industry portfolio 
 62
 The industry adjusted operating performance median of other firms is the 
benchmark used for matching with the operating performance of firm involved in 
takeovers. Barber and Lyon (1996, p. 366) recommends that the comparison between 
changes in performance should provide that a firm’s expected performance is equal to its 
past performance plus the change in the industry’s performance. Barber and Lyon (1996) 
argue that the industry adjusted operating performance measure is a weak measure for 
comparison because it ignores the history of the firm relative to the benchmark and 
suggests that the pre acquisition characteristics of the firms ought to be factored in the 
equation as follows: 
. E (Pit)  = Pi, t – 1 + (PI it - Pi, t – 1)      (3.23) 
Where  
(PI it - Pit – 1) is the pre event industry benchmark.  
E (Pit) is the expected operating performance   
3.10.2 INDUSTRY AND SIZE ADJUSTED OPERATING PERFORMANCE MODEL 
The industry adjusted operating performance fails to control for size of firms prior 
to and after the takeover bid. The third approach recommends that operating performance 
should be adjusted by the performance of a control portfolio of non-acquiring firms 
matched by size and industry (Barber and Lyon 1996; Ghosh 1998)). Ghosh (1998) 
suggests that larger firms are more profitable than smaller firms are such that comparison 
based on industry alone would not be correct. Size has an impact on corporate 
performance (Meeks 1977; Ravenscraft and Scherer 1987 and Jarrell 1995). Jarrell 
measured size as the market value of the firm’s debt plus equity as reported by the value 
line investment report during the quarter before the takeover bid. Meeks (1977) and 
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Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987), both report that acquisitions involving companies of 
similar size have a larger impact on the operating performance of combined firms than 
acquisitions involving companies of different size.  Control firms used in this study are 
those that have neither made nor received a takeover bid matched by industry and size.  
In this study, size is based on the book value of assets rather than market values or sales 
because market values may fluctuate as a result of changes in the market sector as well as 
macroeconomic conditions while sales may be affected by the state of the economy or 
company performance at a particular point in time. The industry and size adjusted 
operating performance model is stated as follows: 
ISAOP post = ISAOP Pre (B) + ISAOP Pre (T)                     (3.24) 
Where  
ISAOP post is the mean (median) industry and size adjusted operating performance 3 
years after the bid, 
ISAOP Pre (B) and ISAOP (T) represent pre acquisition pre bid operating performance. 
Size is the book value of total assets, defined as the book value of equity plus reserves 
plus long term debt and short term less cash and market securities measured one year 
prior to a takeover bid. Asset size of the bidder and target firms is computed as follows: 
Pre EBIT/Total Assets = (EBIT (B)/Total Assets (B)) + (EBIT (T) /Total Assets (T)) (3.25) 
Where,  
Pre EBIT/Total Assets it is the operating performance in the pre acquisition period 
EBIT is operating profit 
Total Assets refer to shareholders funds plus debt less cash and marketable securities 
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The pre acquisition measure of performance, earnings before interest and tax is 
deflated by total assets, is computed for the period 3 years prior to the takeover bid and 
the operating performance in year 0 is omitted to control for any one time costs incurred 
during the acquisition.    
There are two reasons advanced in takeover literature for matching operating 
performance. The first reason is that matching the firms’ controls for potential mean 
reversion in earnings, and other operating ratios (Fama and French 1995). Secondly, tests 
using control firms that are not matched on operating performance are mis-specified if 
the event firms have either especially good or especially poor prior operating 
performance (Barber and Lyon 1996). To test for statistical significance of the levels and 
changes in operating performance, Wilcoxon signed-rank tests and parametric t-tests are 
conducted. Barber and Lyon (1996) infer that due to extreme observations in the 
distribution of operating performance, non-parametric Wilcoxon signed rank tests are 
uniformly more powerful than parametric t-tests. In this study, both tests are conducted 
for completeness. 
3.11 ABNORMAL PERFORMANCE 
 The abnormal return (profitability) is the difference between the pre-acquisition 
combined operating performance of the bidder and target firm and the post acquisition 
performance of the bidding firm for all sub-samples described above. We examine the 
pre-takeover operating performance of targets in the sub-samples according to the 
classification made in chapter 2 to test whether there is a difference in the performance of 
firms in involved in disciplinary and non disciplinary bids.  
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 This study also employs the regression-based approach to estimate for any 
improvements in post-takeover performance to be consistent with previous studies 
(Manson, et. al., 2000; and Powell and Stark, 2005). The post-takeover abnormal profit 
for each acquisition is regressed on an equivalent pre-takeover abnormal profit as 
follows: 
ROA post = α + β ROA pre + ε        (3.26) 
Where 
ROA pre is the mean (or median) operating performance rate for 3 years prior to a 
takeover bid and ROA post is the mean (or median) operating performance rate for 3 
years after the takeover bid.  
The coefficient β allows for mean reversion in profitability and the intercept α is an 
estimate of the average improvements in performance. The mean amount of pre-takeover 
performance left unexplained must be attributable to the takeover. 
3.12 STATISTICAL TEST. 
The abnormal performance AOP derived in the equation (3.26) has a mean of zero 
for a sample of size n is the null hypothesis and is tested for statistical significance 
following the test statistic: 
AOP/ S (AOP) n  
Where  
AOP is the mean abnormal operating performance  
N is the number of years. 
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3.13 MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
In order to examine the relation between changes in performance and pre takeover 
firm characteristics, a multi-regression analysis is conducted to measure changes in 
operating performance due to method of payment, bid type, bid outcome and top 
management change. Dummy variables are included in the equations (hostile bids, lapsed 
bids and top management change). The pre takeover characteristics and classification 
which are assumed to have an impact on post acquisition operating performance are 
assigned a 0 or 1 and multiplied by the independent variable included in the equation 
above. These variables take the value of zero if the method of payment is cash and one 
otherwise; friendly bid are assigned the variable of zero or otherwise. The bid outcome is 
assigned the variable zero if completed and zero otherwise and, top management change 
following a takeover bid is assigned zero and one otherwise. The equation for computing 
the abnormal return where specific pre bid characteristics explain the impact of takeovers 
on post acquisition performance is stated as follows: 
 
IAOP (post i)   = α + β1 IAOP pre i + β2 (bid characteristic) + ∈i        (3.27)   
Where,  
IAOP (post i) is the mean (median) annual IAOP for firm i from post merger years, and 
IAOP (pre i)  is the mean (median) annual IAOP for firm i from pre merger years 
∈i   is the change in performance after takeover bid 
IAOP  is industry adjusted operating performance 
The intercept α represents the effect of takeovers on operating performance. The 
slope coefficient β1 captures any correlation in the industry-adjusted operating 
 67
performance between pre and post acquisition years while β2 captures any correlation 
between operating performance and pre bid characteristics. 
3.14 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The objective of this chapter was to describe the data, the sources and 
methodology for analyzing the data. In this study, the effect of takeovers is evaluated 
using the event study methodology, which examines the share price reaction to the 
takeover bid based on monthly returns (Casey, Dodd and Dolan, 1987). Monthly returns 
data are used in this study in order examine the performance of firms prior to the date of 
announcement of the takeover bids. The ripple effects of a takeover bid are assumed to 
occur over a wide area and over a long period. The assumption is that daily or weekly 
returns may not sufficiently measure the impact of takeovers due to the semi efficient 
state of the UK stock market upon which share prices rely. Due to the stock market semi 
efficiency short falls, this study also evaluates the long-term effect of takeovers by 
examining the operating performance of firms involved in takeovers. The shortfalls of 
market and accounting methodologies are examined with particular emphasis that the 
Financial Times All Share index provides the best estimate of the market return and that 
accounting methodology relies on accounting data from financial statements prepared 
according to accounting standards and verifiable by the auditing profession.  
The benchmark for share price study is the market model (Fama et al., 1969) 
while the benchmark for accounting studies is the industry and size adjusted model 
(Barber and Lyon 1996). Due to data sources and data constraints actual returns were 
obtained from the London Stock Exchange Data base, and accounting data was sourced 
from DataStream. The data for firms involved in takeovers was obtained from various 
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editions of the Acquisitions Monthly for the period 1990 to 1997 published by the 
Thomson’s Financial and evidence of management changes was obtained from various 
editions of London Stock Exchange Year books for the period 1988 though to 1999. 
Evidence of routine and non-routine management changes in target firms was cross 
checked with data in the financial press most notably, the Lexis-Nexus website. 
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CHAPTER 4 
ANALYSIS OF CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURNS 
4.1 CHAPTER OBJECTIVE 
The main objective of this chapter is to report on the performance of companies 
involved in takeover bids in the period prior to the date of announcement. This chapter 
presents the results of the pre bid share price of companies involved in takeover bids for 
the period 1990 to 1997. The second objective of this chapter is to examine several 
specific pre bid firm characteristics to establish whether they explain improvements to 
share price performance after the takeover bid.  
4.2 INTRODUCTION 
Share prices of companies in well-established markets convey information about 
the market value of a firm. In an efficient stock market investors and financial analysts 
monitor share prices of listed companies and major decisions are made as to which 
companies should investments or divestitures made. In mergers and acquisitions falling 
share prices convey certain information about firms and targets of a takeover bid exhibit 
falling share prices on the stock market. On the other hand rising share prices convey 
information about the expected increases in profitability of firms exhibiting rising share 
prices. Stagnant share price levels convey certain information about firms that have less 
growth potential.   
In this chapter I measure the share price performance of bidders and targets of a 
takeover bid in the effect of takeovers on the share price of acquiring firms 12 months 
prior to the takeover announcement and the effect 12 months after the date of 
announcement. I also report on the effect of disciplinary takeovers on the share price of 
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target firms prior to the takeover announcement in completed bids and the share price 
performance in unsuccessful bids. For targets in lapsed bids I examine the effect of 
disciplinary bids around the date of announcement. I expect to find that the performance 
of acquiring firms in completed bids to be significantly greater after the takeover 
announcement than prior to the takeover bid. This improvement is attributed to the 
expected efficient use of the assets of the acquired firm by the acquiring firm 
management. I also expect to find significant decline in the performance of firms in 
lapsed bids due to the failure of a takeover bid. I also examine share price performance in 
other categories namely, friendly and hostile bids, and changes in top management post 
takeover.  
4.3 PRE BID SHARE PRICE PERFORMANCE 
The first test in this study concerns pre acquisition performance. Takeover 
literature suggests that targets in a takeover bid under perform prior to a takeover bid. 
This hypothesis therefore implies that bidders exhibit superior pre bid performance when 
compared to their targets (Jensen 1984). The results of this study are derived from 
computing the abnormal return where actual return is adjusted based on the market model 
(Fama et al., 1969). The results are presented in table 4.1 through to 4.14 
 Table 4.1 shows the pre acquisition share price performance of bidders and targets 
where the abnormal and the cumulative abnormal returns are computed based on the 
market model. The abnormal return and the cumulative abnormal return in the event 
window where t = -13 is -0.62% and 4.98% for bidding firms and –1.75% and –54.35% 
for target firms. The cumulative average abnormal return around the date of 
announcement is 2.08% for bidding and 0.16% for target firms. These results suggest that 
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both bidding and target firms gain at the date of announcement. These gains also suggest 
both bidders and targets perform poorly in the period prior to a takeover bid. However 
based on the cumulative abnormal return target firms perform poorly whereas bidding 
firms’ performance is better than the market anticipates. The magnitude of these gains 
suggests that target firms perform poorly while bidding firms exhibit superior 
performance in the same period. These results are consistent with the view that targets of 
a takeover bid under perform in the period prior to the date of announcement of the bid 
(Limmack 1991). 
 Announce period results from further tests on share price performance based on 
classification of takeover bids are shown in tables 4.2 to 4.7. Bidding firms, on average, 
earn significant negative abnormal returns around the date of announcement. However 
bidders earn insignificant positive cumulative abnormal returns around the date of 
announcement. During the same period target firms earn significant positive abnormal 
returns but cumulative abnormal returns for bids in failed, top management change, 
friendly and hostile classification show insignificant negative cumulative abnormal 
returns. These results are consistent with the findings reported by Jensen (1976) that 
bidders do not gain from a takeover bid but earn insignificant positive abnormal returns 
around the date of announcement. The results shown in tables 4.8 to 4.12 are computed 
using the Market Adjusted Return Model and they indicate similar trend as reported 
under the Market Model in tables 4.1 to 4.7 that bidders do not generate significant 
positive abnormal returns while targets earn significant positive abnormal returns and 
poor cumulative abnormal returns.  The share price performance for bids viewed as 
disciplinary show that targets earn significant positive abnormal returns. Abnormal 
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returns for bids, which report management change and those, which are hostile show 
significant positive abnormal returns but insignificant cumulative abnormal returns. This 
is consistent with the view that disciplinary bids are associated with top management 
change and hostility (Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, 1990). 
4.4 POST BID SHARE PRICE PERFORMANCE 
Results in table 4.1 show that bidders perform poorly in the period after the bid. 
The cumulative abnormal return, -4.54% at t, = 12 worsens to –14.79% 24 months after 
the date of announcement. However, after classification of takeover bids, bidders exhibit 
good performance in failed bids where the cumulative abnormal return is 19.54% and 
12.43% 12 months and 24 months respectively after the date of announcement.   Based 
on these results, takeovers are value-decreasing events for shareholders of bidding firms.  
These results are consistent with the view that hostile bids do not imply pre bid poor 
performance but bidding firm managers recognize potential gains that might be achieved 
after the takeover Schwert (2000).  These results are similar to the findings of Franks and 
Mayer (1996) who report that some firms are subject to hostile bid for other reasons other 
than poor pre bid performance.     
 The share price performance of bidders is also illustrated in figures 4.1 to 4.7. The 
results suggest that in the period prior to the date of announcement, bidders generate 
positive gains based on the market adjusted returns. The performance of bidders in 
completed bids declines from around five months after the date of announcement. 
However, the gains in takeover that lapse those that are hostile continue to rise after the 
date of announcement as reflected in figures 4.3 and 4.7 respectively. The trend is similar 
to the performance for bidders where there is top management change in target after the 
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bid. These results suggest that bidding firm shareholders benefit from mergers and 
acquisitions, and this is in consistent with the view that bidders do not lose in takeover 
bids (Baker and Limmack, 1999). Declining share price performance as reflected figures 
4.1, 4.2, 4.5 and 4. 6 are consistent with the view that gains disappear over time when the 
operations of the firms revert to normal (Barber and Lyon, 1997). Overall, the 
performance of bidders in hostile bids is inconsistent with the view that share price 
performance in hostile bids is not significantly different from share price performance in 
friendly bids (Cosh and Guest, 2001)  
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Table 4.1 Share Price Performance: Market Model (MM) Bidders and Targets Prior 
to classification of takeover bids: 
 Abnormal Return  Cumulative Abnormal Return  
Bidders (n, = 153) t = 0 -0.52 % 
(-0.515) 
2.08% 
(0.572) 
Targets  (n, = 153) t = 0 
 
Targets  (n, = 153) t = 12 
Targets  (n, = 153) t = 24 
16.12% 
(0.002) 
 
0.16% 
(0.000) 
-4.54% 
-14.79 % 
 
 
 
Table 4.2 Share Price Performance: Market Model (MM) Bidders and Targets: 
Completed bids 
 Abnormal Return at t, = 0 Cumulative Abnormal 
Return at t, = 0 
Bidders (n, = 134) -0.87 % 
(-0.789) 
1.53% 
(0.3832) 
Targets  (n, = 134) 17% 
(0.002) 
3.50% 
(0.000) 
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Table 4.3 Share Price Performance: Market Model (MM) Bidders and Targets: 
Lapsed bids 
 Abnormal Return at t, = 0 Cumulative Abnormal 
Return at t, = 0 
Bidders (n, = 19) t, = 0 2.32 % 
(0.775) 
7.85% 
(0.728) 
Targets  (n, = 19) t = 0 
 
Targets (n =19) t = 12 
9.86% 
(0.001) 
19.54% 
-23.38% 
(-0.001) 
12.43% 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.4 Share Price Performance: Market Model (MM) Bidders and Targets: Top 
Management Change 
 Abnormal Return at t, = 0 Cumulative Abnormal 
Return at t, = 0 
Bidders (n, = 44) -.0.89% 
(-0.570) 
2.0% 
(0.343) 
Targets  (n, = 44) 19.67 % * 
(7.834) 
-7.61% 
(-0.8408) 
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Table 4.5 Share Price Performance: Market Model (MM) Bidders and Targets: No 
Top Management Change 
 Abnormal Return at t, = 0 Cumulative Abnormal 
Return at t, = 0 
Bidders (n, = 109) -153.82% 
(-1.109) 
61.60% 
(0.123) 
Targets  (n, = 44) 14.68 % * 
(8.076) 
3.29% 
(0.503) 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.6 Share Price Performance: Market Model (MM) Bidders and Targets: 
Friendly Bids 
 Abnormal Return at t, = 0 Cumulative Abnormal 
Return at t, = 0 
Bidders (n, = 121) -0.78% 
(0.775) 
1.15% 
Targets  (n, = 121) 14.49% * 
(11.46) 
-2.51% 
(-0.551) 
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Table 4.7 Share Price Performance: Market Model (MM) Bidders and Targets: 
Hostile Bids 
 Abnormal Return at t, = 0 Cumulative Abnormal 
Return at t, = 0 
Bidders (n, = 32) 0.57% 
(0.260) 
 
1.90% 
(0.240) 
Targets  (n, = 32) 22.29% * 
(7.36) 
-10.34% 
(-0.937) 
 
 
 
Table 4.8 Share Price Performance: Market Adjusted Return Model (MAR) Bidders 
and Targets Prior to classification of takeover bids: 
 Abnormal Return at t, = 0 Cumulative Abnormal 
Return at t, = 0 
Bidders (n, = 153) 0.18% 
(-0.1579) 
53% 
(0.1296) 
Targets  (n, = 153) 6.78%* 
(4.576) 
2.88% 
(0.539) 
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Table 4.9 Share Price Performance: Market Adjusted Return Model (MAR) Bidders 
and Targets: Completed bids 
 Abnormal Return at t, = 0 Cumulative Abnormal 
Return at t, = 0 
Bidders (n, = 134) -0.02 % 
(-0.016) 
13% 
(0.278) 
Targets  (n, = 134) 6.27% 
(0.001) 
3.77% 
(0.000) 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.10 Share Price Performance: Market Adjusted Return Model (MAR) Bidders 
and Targets: Lapsed bids 
 Abnormal Return at t, = 0 Cumulative Abnormal 
Return at t, = 0 
Bidders (n, = 19) 2.52 % 
(0.808) 
7.23% 
(0.665) 
Targets  (n, = 19) 10.31% 
(0.001) 
-3.38% 
(0.000) 
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Table 4.11 Share Price Performance: Market Adjusted Model (MAR) Bidders and 
Targets: Top Management Change 
 Abnormal Return at t, = 0 Cumulative Abnormal 
Return at t, = 0 
Bidders (n, = 44) 1.56% 
(1.108) 
5.53% 
(0.998) 
Targets  (n, = 44) 15.95 % * 
(5.978) 
22.85%* 
(2.375) 
 
 
 
Table 4.12 Share Price Performance: Market Adjusted Model (MAR) Bidders and 
Targets: No Top Management Change 
 Abnormal Return at t, = 0 Cumulative Abnormal 
Return at t, = 0 
Bidders (n, = 109) -0.42% 
(-0.211) 
-1.55% 
(-0.217) 
Targets  (n, = 109) 3.07 % ** 
(1.770) 
-5.18% 
(-0.829) 
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Table 4.13 Share Price Performance: Market Adjusted Model (MAR) Bidders and 
Targets: Friendly Bids 
 Abnormal Return at t, = 0 Cumulative Abnormal 
Return at t, = 0 
Bidders (n, = 121) 0.03% 
(0.0217) 
-0.64% 
(-0.640) 
Targets  (n, = 121) 9.53% * 
(5.145) 
10.12%** 
(1.514) 
 
 
 
Table 4.14 Share Price Performance: Market Adjusted Model (MAR) Bidders and 
Targets: Hostile Bids 
 Abnormal Return at t, = 0 Cumulative Abnormal 
Return at t, = 0 
Bidders (n, = 32) 0.1% 
(0.0404) 
5.99% 
(0.6975) 
Targets  (n, = 32) -3.65%  
(-0.904) 
-24.49%** 
(-1.685) 
 
 
 
 
 81
Figure 4.1 Share Price Performance of Bidders (Market Adjusted Model)  
 
        
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
 
 
Figure 4.2 Share Price Performance of Bidders in Completed Bids 
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Figure 4.3 Share Price Performance of Bidders in Failed Bids 
 
         
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
 
 
Figure 4.4 Top Management Change Share Price Performance of Bidders  
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Figure 4.5 No Top Management Change Share Price Performance of Bidders  
 
         
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
 
Figure 4.6 Share Price Performance of Bidders in Friendly Bids 
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Figure 4.7 Share Price Performance of Bidders in Hostile Bids 
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4.6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS  
The objective of this study was to examine whether takeovers perform a 
disciplinary function on poorly performing firms. Evidence in this study suggests that 
their targets of a takeover bid under perform prior to the bid due to the significant 
positive abnormal returns earned around the date of announcement. Evidence in this 
study also suggests that takeovers are disciplinary they lead to improvements in share 
price performance after the takeover bid. The evidence arising from this study however 
suggests that post bid share price performance cumulative abnormal are not significantly 
greater or worse than zero. Management change results in improvement of performance 
for the reporting firm but the gains are significantly greater than zero. However, top 
management change results in greater gains than no top management change takeovers. 
This is consistent with the view that the disciplinary effect of takeovers implies that 
management of target firms are replaced by a superior management order to create 
greater value for the firm (Martin and McConnell, 1991). Evidence from these results 
also suggest that the threat of a takeover encourages managers of target firms to act in 
shareholders interests by taking actions that maximize value, hence insignificant 
cumulative abnormal returns.  
This study examined the share price performance of firms involved in takeover 
activity to detect any abnormal returns around the takeover bid. The main findings of this 
study suggest that takeovers are value-decreasing events. Evidence in this study suggests 
that bidders exhibit superior performance when compared with the market and when 
compared with target firms. Targets of a takeover bid under perform in the period prior to 
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a takeover bid. Basing on the cumulative abnormal return as a measure of corporate 
performance, takeovers are value-reducing events.  
Management changes following takeovers lead to improvement in the 
performance of the combined firm. Management retention redeployed in the combined 
firm leads to decline in share price performance. This is consistent with the inefficient 
management hypothesis that target firms under perform in the period prior to a takeover 
bid due to having inefficient managers. 
The third observation regarding friendly and hostile bids suggests that there is no 
significant difference in the performance of firms in the two groups. The disciplinary 
effect of takeovers does not depend on whether the bid is hostile or friendly and is 
perceived more as an act of extracting a higher price by target firm management.  
Hostility is in the eye of the beholder (Schwert, 2000)  
The fourth observation in the study is concerned with whether the threat of a 
takeover bid is disciplinary. Completed bids exhibit decline in post bid performance 
while lapsed bids exhibit improvements in share price performance. These results are 
consistent with the findings of Dodd and Ruback (1977), Firth (1980, Asquith (1983, 
Limmack (1991) who find negative post bid performance of firms involved in completed 
bids and that the gains/losses reported are not statistically significant.  
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CHAPTER 5 
ANALYSIS OF OPERATING PERFORMANCE 
5.1 CHAPTER OBJECTIVE  
The objective of this chapter is to analyse and report on the operating 
performance of UK firms involved in takeover activity in the period 1990 - 1997.   
5.2 INTRODUCTION 
According to economic theory takeover activity is viewed as a disciplinary device 
for poorly performing firms and as such they suggest that targets in takeover bids are 
those that exhibit poor performance. The empirical evidence in this study is consistent 
with the view of the corporate takeover market as a court of last resort, that is, it is an 
external source of discipline when internal control mechanisms are relatively weak or are 
ineffective. 
5.3 OPERATING PERFORMANCE 
This study primarily examines the operating performance of companies involved 
in bids that are perceived to be disciplinary. If takeovers are viewed as disciplinary 
events, the operating performance of target firms should be poorer than that of bidders 
and control firms. The summary statistics reported in Table 1 show that targets of a 
takeover bid for the period and sample under review are larger than bidding firms in 
terms of total assets, sales volume and capital employed. However the operating 
performance shows that on average, bidding firms are more efficient that target firms. 
This is inconsistent with the view that bidders are larger than target firms in takeover bids 
(Singh, 1971, 1975) Table 5.2 shows the pre acquisition of targets compared to bidders 
and control firms. Table 5.3 shows the effect of takeovers on the operating performance 
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of combined firms. Table 5.4 shows the effect of takeovers over the years relative to one 
year prior to the takeover bid. Table 5.5 illustrates the impact of the takeover bid in sub 
samples using the industry adjusted and industry and size adjusted operating 
performance. These results are presented and discussed in turn as follows. 
5.3.1 PRE BID OPERATING PERFORMANCE 
Results in Table 5.2 Panel A and C, suggest that bidding firms outperformed both 
control firms and target firms for bids that occurred in the period 1990 to 1997. However, 
the difference between bidders and target operating performance is significantly different 
from zero in each of the years –3, -2 and –1 relative to the year of bid. Results in Table 
5.1 Panel C show that target firms outperform control firms in the period –5, -4 and –3 
relative to the year takeover bid. In the period –2 and – 1 years relative to the takeover 
bid the results suggest that target perform worse than target firms do although the 
difference is not significantly different from zero. These results are consistent with other 
studies that reported that targets of a takeover bid perform poorly in the period prior to a 
takeover bid. This finding is consistent therefore, with the view that bidding firms’ 
operating performance is more superior than the operating performance of target firms 
and that bidding do target poorly performing firms for acquisition.  
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Table 5.1 Summary Statistics 
 Bidders Targets 
Number of bids 153 153 
Book value of assets (median) 20197  25554 
Sales (median) 13686 14275 
Capital 17251 18256 
EBIT 2189 2110 
EBIT/TA 10.84% 8.57% 
EBIT/SALES 15.99% 15.33% 
EBIT/CAPITAL 12.69% 11.99% 
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5.2 Pre Bid Operating Performance 
Panel A Period Bidders Targets Z statistic 
 -5 13% 12% 0.753 
 -4 13% 10% 2.423 
 -3 12% 9% 2.652 
 -2 10% 7% 3.465 
 -1 9% 7% 3.137 
Panel B  Targets Controls  
 -5 12% 8% 3.023 
 -4 12% 10% 2.799 
 -3 9% 7% 1.473 
 -2 4% 7% .0183 
 -1 0 8% 1.71 
Panel C  Bidders Targets  
 -5 13% 12% 0.478 
 -4 13% 12% 1.827 
 -3 12% 9% 3.846 
 -2 10% 4% 5.235 
 -1 9% 0 5.702 
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Table 5.3 Pre and Post bid Operating Performance Relative to 1 Year Prior to Year 
of Bid 
Panel A Parametric Test   
Period -5 -4 -3 -2 1 2 3 
Mean 13.76% 11.51% 6.76% 1.62% -.5.76% -5.7% -6.7% 
T Statistic 6.252 6.781 4.893 1.063 2.514 2.576 2.997 
N 153 153 153 153 153 153 153 
 
Panel B Wilcoxon Signed Ranked Test 
Median 11.21% 10.98% 7.04% 1.65% -2.1% -3.17% -5.11% 
Sum of 
Ranks 
 9151 8653 8243 4648 4918 5484 6011 
Z 
Statistics 
8.334 7.881 7.507 4.317 4568 5094 5.639 
N 153 153 153 153 153 153 153 
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5.3.2 POST BID OPERATING PERFORMANCE  
Table 5.3 shows the results of comparing the pre bid operating performance of 
combined firms and the post bid operating performance of the bidding firm relative to the 
combined operating performance of bidding and target firms in the year – 1 relative to the 
takeover bid. These results indicate that the effect of the takeover bid, on average, leads 
to poor post bid operating performance in respect to the combined pre bid operating 
performance in the year – 1 relative to the bid. The results suggest that the takeover has a 
negative effect on the operating performance of combined firms. The post bid operating 
performance declines and a waste of shareholders resources. If these firms go on to 
merge, the poor post bid operating performance suggest the bid is not made in the 
interests of bidding firm shareholders. The firms would be better off not merging, and the 
bidding firms’ financial resources would better be used on other things, such as 
increasing dividends to shareholders.   
5.4 EFFECT OF BID CLASSIFICATION ON POST BID OPERATING 
PERFORMANCE 
The second tests of the effect of takeovers on operating performance focus on pre 
bid classification of takeover bids. Table 5.4; show results in takeover bids that involve 
changes in the position of top management of target firms one year after the bids. The test 
here is whether changes in the position of top management immediately after a takeover 
lead to improvement in the operating performance of the combined firm. In this table, 
parametric tests indicate that changes in the position of top management in the target 
firms leads to poor performance. However, this poor performance is not significantly 
different from zero. In the situation where there are no changes in the position of target 
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firms after the takeover bid, the change in the operating performance is positive and 
significantly different from zero. Table 5.4 also suggests that the change in operating 
performance is positive both where there is top management change. These results 
suggest that top management changes have a bearing on post bid operating performance 
for firms involved in takeover bids.     
Table 5.4, also shows results of the effect of takeover bids on operating 
performance in successful bids and failed bids. The results indicate positive changes in 
operating performance in both instances, suggesting that in both instances takeovers lead 
to post bid improvement in operating performance. However, the post bid performance in 
failed bids is positive but not significantly different from zero. The results in successful 
and failed bids are inconsistent with literature, which suggest that post bid operating 
performance is worse for combined firms compared to their pre bid operating 
performance. 
Table 5.4 also shows results for takeover bids in friendly bids and hostile bids. 
These results suggest that uncontested bids lead to significant improvement in operation 
performance whereas the contested bids do not lead to significant improvements in post 
bid operating performance. These results are consistent with the view that hostility is in 
the eye of the beholder, that is, it is no different from friendly bids (Schwert, 2000).  
Results in Table 5.5 attempt to show the difference in operating performance of 
sub samples evaluating the industry adjusted operating performance (Healy et. al., 1992). 
The results based on the industry adjusted return model show positive changes but 
insignificant improvements in operating performance. This suggests that takeovers are 
profitable over time. β is greater than zero in the three sub samples of takeover bids.  The 
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results suggest that takeovers, based on pre bid operating performance, have a significant 
positive effect on post bid operating performance between sub-samples based on pre bid 
classification. 
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Table 5.4 Effect of Bid Classification on Operating Performance 
 Management 
Change 
No 
Management 
Change 
Completed 
Bids 
Failed 
Bids 
Friendly 
Bids 
Hostile 
Bids 
α 0.087* 0.072* 0.076* 0.029 0.076* 0.029 
β 0.006 0.083* 0.06* 0.312 0.06* 0.312 
R 
Square 
0 0.073 0.047 0.217 0.047 0.217 
F 
Statistic 
0.005 9.285 6.567 4.709 6.567 4.709 
N 33 120 134 19 131 32 
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Table 5.5 Evaluating the Difference between Sub-Samples (Industry Adjusted 
Operating Performance) 
 Effect of 
takeover bid on 
operating 
performance 
Effect of 
management 
change on 
operating 
performance 
Effect of 
Hostile and 
Friendly bids 
on operating 
performance 
Effect of 
successful and 
failed bids on 
operating 
performance 
α 0.10 0.008 -0.001 0.057 
β 1.022* 1.026* 1.023* 1.031* 
R Square 89.772 44.65 44.712 46.856 
F Statistic 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
N 0.373 0.373 0.373 0.385 
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5.5 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The main objective of this chapter was to present and discuss results of this study 
based on the question whether targets under perform in the period prior to a takeover bid. 
The measure used to analyze performance is earnings scaled by total assets. This measure 
of operating performance was chosen over other measures of accounting performance 
because common sense and the majority of shareholders perceive profitability as a better 
yardstick to measure efficiency over an accounting period. Other statistics such as 
gearing, operating cash flows are indicators of performance but they are mainly used for 
making managerial decisions. Accounting results, focusing on profitability as a measure 
of operating performance suggest that, in the period prior to a takeover bid, target under 
perform from year –3 to year –1. Based on accounting results, takeovers are disciplinary 
if target firms under perform in the period prior to the takeover bid. This is consistent 
with a number of studies that suggest that targets of a disciplinary bid are those that 
perform poorly in the period prior to the takeover bid.  
This study also examined whether there is significant improvements in the 
operating performance of combined firms after the completion or lapse of takeover bid. 
The findings of the study suggest that takeovers do not lead to improvements in operating 
performance of combined firms. These results would lead one to conclude that takeovers 
are not beneficial in the end (Mueller, 1986) and consistent with the view that managers 
of bidding firms do not act in the interest of shareholders when they embark on 
acquisitions.  
The post bid operating performance of combined firms was further examined 
based on classification of the bids into sub samples perceived to be disciplinary. The 
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results of this study, based on classification of takeover bids suggest that failed bids and 
hostile bids have no significant impact on post bid operating performance. Post bid 
management change however has a bearing on post bid operating performance.  
These findings in this study suggest that though target under perform in 
comparison to bidders; they do not perform poorly as they do operate at a loss prior to the 
date of announcement. These findings are consistent with earlier studies (Powell and 
Stark, 2005; Ghosh, 2001; Dahya, 2002; Conyon, 1998; and Conyon and Nicholas, 
1998), which report that takeover activity is not directly motivated by the inefficient 
management hypothesis.  
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CHAPTER 6 
TAKEOVERS AND CORPORATE PERFORMANCE 
6.1 CHAPTER DESCRIPTION 
The main objective of this chapter is to present the overall view of the thesis, the 
summary and implications and limitations of the main empirical findings in this study.    
6.2 STUDY OVERVIEW 
Takeovers are viewed as performing a disciplinary function if they are directed at 
poorly performing firms prior to the launch of the bid. The performance of firms in 
takeover bids can be assessed by measuring their economic performance (Cowling, 1980) 
Previous research has focused on the wealth effects of takeover bids and very few 
focusing on the disciplinary impact. It was the objective of this study to bridge the gap in 
knowledge by providing evidence as to whether takeovers provide a disciplinary 
mechanism using a UK database of companies involved in takeovers in the period 1990 
to 1997. The period was chosen due to the proposition that takeovers as a disciplinary 
device are no longer necessary since the publication of the Cadbury Report in 1992, 
which advocated strengthening internal controls to safe guard shareholders’ investment.  
 Chapter 2 was a review of literature on mergers and acquisitions that are 
perceived to be disciplinary. In the review, it was suggested that, basing on share price 
evaluation and profitability, takeovers are not disciplinary. The chapter also discussed the 
reported motives of mergers and acquisitions that have a disciplinary bearing on target 
firms. In order to ascertain and measure the disciplinary effect, takeover bids were 
classified into sub-samples perceived to be disciplinary.  
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Chapter 3 defined the criteria for classifying takeover bids that were included in 
the sample, and sources of data and the methodology for evaluating corporate 
performance of companies involved in acquisitions. The sample used in this study was 
derived from various publications of the Acquisition Monthly whereas classification of 
bids in terms of hostility, successfulness and top management changes was arrived at by 
checking relevant information in the financial press. Share price and accounting data was 
collected from different sources in order to get the balance. Share price data was 
collected from the London Business School Database while accounting data was 
extracted from Data Stream. Share price performance was analyzed by evaluating 
cumulative abnormal return with the market return as the benchmark (Fama et al 1969). 
Accounting performance focused on profitability, with the industry and size adjusted 
operating performance model (Barber and Lyon 1996, Healy et. al., 1992 and Ghosh, 
2001). This study evaluated performance to produce information that is relevant to 
shareholders who have no inside information. Other accounting data was not examined 
because the results derived from analyzing this data produces information more for the 
benefit of insiders such as managers and outsiders such as shareholders. This view is 
taken because decisions on takeovers, especially disciplinary takeovers as a court of last 
resort, are taken with a view to benefit shareholders, and not insiders.   
6.3 FINDINGS 
This examined the incidence of takeover bids around the publication of the 
Cadbury Report in 1992. The recommendations made in the Cadbury Report published in 
1992 are prescriptive for all UK listed companies, but the increase in the frequency of 
takeover bids after the publication suggests that UK takeover bids are not disciplinary but 
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are made due to other motives such as risk spreading through diversification, synergy or 
hubris.    
The main findings of this study are reported in chapters 4 (Analysis of 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns) and chapter 5 (Analysis of Operating Performance). This 
section is a summary of the major findings of the research based on the specific 
objectives outlined in Chapter 1. Both uni-variate and multivariate analyses were 
undertaken to test the developed null hypotheses of zero abnormal returns and zero mean 
differences between sub samples of takeover bids. T-tests were used to test for difference 
of means and changes in corporate performance.  Medians were used in evaluating 
accounting performance.  
6.4 PRE BID PERFORMANCE 
The main objective of this study thesis was to analyze the level of pre acquisition 
operating performance of bidders, targets and their respective controls and the results are 
discussed in this chapter.  The empirical evidence in the UK during the period 1990-1997 
indicates that target companies performance is not significantly different from their 
respective bidding firms over the 5-year period prior to acquisition. The results for tests 
of hypothesis 1 in terms of share price performance and operating performance provide 
evidence to support hypothesis 1. The results of the share price performance are 
consistent with the view that in a disciplinary takeover, targets under perform in the 
period prior to acquisition (Manne 1965, Fama and Jensen 1983 and Jensen, 1988). The 
results for tests of hypothesis 2 provide evidence to support hypothesis 2. These results 
are consistent with the view that targets of a takeover bid under perform prior to bid. The 
results for tests of hypothesis 3 and 4 provide insufficient evidence to support hypotheses 
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3 and 4. These results therefore, although they suggest underperformance for bids 
perceived disciplinary, they are inconsistent with the view that hostile bids and lapsed 
bids perform significantly worse than friendly and completed bids respectively. The 
difference of the performance in these sub samples is not significantly different from 
zero.  Accounting performance, however, showed that targets under performed in 
comparison to bidders and control firms but in most cases, the difference is not 
significantly different from zero. The result is consistent with Manne’s concept of market 
for corporate control, which suggests that more capable and competent executive teams 
tend to replace those that are less capable and competent.  Based on the results in the 
current study, acquisitions in UK appear to be non-disciplinary in nature.  
6.5. POST BID CORPORATE PERFORMANCE 
The second objective of this study was to find out whether there was any 
improvement in post acquisition operating performance of UK firms. The results for tests 
of hypothesis 5 do not provide sufficient evidence to support hypothesis 5. Post bid share 
price and operating performance is worse than pre bid corporate performance although 
the same results indicate insignificant improvements in lapsed bids. The results are 
consistent with management entrenchment hypothesis where takeover bids are made with 
a view to maximize managerial utility common with managers who are too optimistic 
(Roll 1986). Despite the non-disciplinary motives, the results in chapter 4 provide 
evidence that acquisitions in the UK during the period 1990-1997 lead to improvements 
in the operating performance in the end and these results are consistent with Ravenscraft 
and Scherer (1987).  The post acquisition median control adjusted operating performance 
for the combined firms is significantly higher than their performance during the 5-year 
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period prior to acquisition.  Post acquisition median control adjusted operating 
performance is then regressed on the pre acquisition operating performance and the 
intercept indicates that the combined firms obtain an insignificant decrease of 4.0% per 
year in post acquisition period.  The improvement in post acquisition operating 
performance is inconsistent with the results reported by Healy et al.  (1992) and Ghosh 
(2001) for US acquisitions, and by Manson et al., (2005) 
The reasons for no improvements in corporate performance have been attributed 
to over expectations by managers of bidding firms. Managers of the acquiring firm do 
experience control problems especially where they do not have the specialist knowledge 
and skill to integrate the new firm. When a combined firm becomes more complex, the 
acquiring firm management may lose control and inefficiency becomes the order of the 
day. This inefficiency increases operating costs and reduces subsequent profitability.  
 Secondly, profitability declines due to overpayment of premium on acquisition of 
target firm. Contested bids, prolonged negotiations and competition among bidders have 
an impact of the post acquisition profitability of the combined firm. Profitable returns on 
significant investments such as acquisitions take time to be realized. Unfortunately, 
management performance is assessed within a specific period; an accounting period is 
usually a year in Anglo-Saxon models of accounting periods. 
 The results in this study seem to suggest that takeover bids in the UK do aim to 
reap benefits from synergy, however, management fail to reap these synergies. Change in 
the position of top management for target firms does not generate significant gains. This 
can be explained by the agency hypothesis and the hubris hypothesis. The agency 
hypothesis posits that takeover bids are motivated by the self-interest of bidding firm 
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management rather than maximizing shareholder wealth. Successful bids allow managers 
to diversify their personal portfolio and increase the size of the firm (Firth, 1979; Amihud 
and Lev, 1981 and Amihud and Travlos, 1990). Poor post bid operating performance is a 
direct consequence of management making takeover decisions for personal gratification. 
Personal gratification normally arises from empire building related financial benefits. 
Berkovich and Narayan (1993) attribute reductions in post bid performance to the agency 
hypothesis. The results of this study therefore are consistent with the agency hypothesis 
since the successful bids generated poor operating results. 
 The hubris hypothesis posits that managers of bidding firm exhibit traits of 
character filled with self-assuring confidence in their behavior towards acquisitions (Roll, 
1986). Managers over estimate the benefits from takeover bids because they believe they 
can generate higher profits from a hopeless transaction. Since target firms are viewed as 
those poorly managed, bidding firm managers believe they would manage the target firm 
to make more profits. The results from this study show that bidding firm managers 
exhibited elements hubris attitude in pursuing disciplinary bids. This is consistent with 
Gregory (1997) who concluded that bidding firm managers display hubris when pursuing 
takeovers.      
6.6 EFFECT OF BID CHARACTERISTICS ON POST BID PERFORMANCE 
The study examined the impact of bid characteristics on post acquisition 
performance. Findings suggest that pre bid characteristics of the bid have an effect post 
bid performance. However, other explanatory variables such as friendly or hostile, and 
top management changes post bid have insignificant impact on post acquisition 
performance. However, share price studies indicate that over all targets under perform 
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bidders prior to a takeover bid while accounting studies report that there is no serious 
significant under performance. Evidence in this study suggest that targets that survive a 
takeover bid continue to decline in performance suggesting that gains made prior to a 
takeover bid disappear when a bid lapses.  
Takeover motives vary, but the main reason is that they are investment decisions, 
which should be consistent with the maximization of shareholder wealth theory of the 
firm (Shleifer and Vishny, 1989; Matsusaka, 1993). Specifically management turnover 
has not been examined in answering the takeover question because managers leave the 
firm for various reasons and very few companies report the real reason for managers 
leaving the firm. This study however indicates that there is no significant differences 
between those firms that are replace departing managers by insider promotions and 
outside appointments. This calls for a finer distinction between disciplinary and non-
disciplinary takeovers (Denis and Denis, 1995, Martin and McConnell 1991; Kennedy 
and Limmack, 1996). Evidence in this study is consistent with the view that the retention 
of existing management is meant to ensure continuity rather than aimed at performance 
improvement. This is consistent with Walsh (1988) who suggest that superior post 
acquisition performance is likely to result when top management are replaced in related 
acquisitions.  Therefore, management retention is evidence that some takeovers are not 
wholly intended to remove existing management.  
6.7 CONCLUSIONS 
Finally, this study focused on examining whether targets of a takeover bid 
perform poorly in the period prior to a takeover bid and that gains from takeover bids 
arise from synergy and the replacement of managers of poorly performing. The results of 
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this study are inconsistent with this view because pre acquisition share price and 
profitability shows that targets under perform when compared with bidders but the 
difference is not significant in the period 1990 to 1997. The results of this study also 
indicate that takeovers do not lead to improvements in the operating performance of 
combined firms. These results therefore suggest takeovers are disciplinary only as far as 
replacing managers of poorly performing firms by bidding firms who exhibit superior 
performance in the period prior to the bid. Takeovers, based on results in this study, do 
not lead to improved operating performance. 
The results and implications of this study should be considered in light of the 
following limitations. First, the dataset was limited to firms that are listed on the London 
Stock Exchange. This criterion reduced the size of the database and this could have had 
an impact of the results. In any statistical analysis, results that are more reliable arise 
from a larger sample than from a smaller sample. However, this sample is sufficiently 
large to draw reasonable conclusions of whether takeovers are disciplinary. Secondly, 
this study was affected by data availability and sample size problems. This study 
however, excluded all takeover bids where the bidder or target in the same bid had 
insufficient data. The sources of share price and accounting data were from the London 
Business School Database and Data Stream respectively. Finally, the takeover bids 
examined in this study include a mixture of tender offers, friendly and hostile bids (Cosh 
and Guest (2001). Multiple bids were excluded from the sample to reduce contaminating 
effects arising from different motives for takeover bids (Berkovich and Narayan, 1993; 
Bruner, 1988; Cosh et. Al., 1990; Caves, 1989)          
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The main objective of the study was to examine whether takeovers are 
disciplinary by examining both share price performance and operating performance. 
Evaluation of performance focused on cumulative abnormal returns and profitability 
because of the considered view that these measures that are of real significance that 
enable shareholders to make decisions that affect the acquisition or failure of the bid. The 
results also suggest that there is marginal increase of takeover bids from the period prior 
to the publication of the Cadbury Report in 1992 to the period after the publication of this 
report. The marginal increase in the number of takeover bids suggests that the Cadbury 
Report has no significant effect on the incidence of takeover bids. This therefore suggests 
that takeovers in the UK are not motivated by the inefficient management hypothesis 
(Mueller, 1977; Mikkelson, Wayne and Parch, 1997). UK mergers and acquisitions are 
motivated by a whole range of considerations, which include marginalizing shareholders 
and consolidating corporate control by incumbent managers of bidding firms.  
Are UK takeovers disciplinary? Although the results in this and earlier studies 
suggest that targets of a takeover bid under perform in the period prior to the bid, bidding 
firms do not significantly outperform targets. Are UK hostile bids disciplinary? Hostility 
in the market for corporate control, by definition, is based on the reaction of target firm 
management in response to bid offer, and not based on prior performance. Are UK 
takeovers in lapsed bids disciplinary? While there are greater gains in lapsed bids as 
compared to completed bids, these bids are not disciplinary. Does top management 
change reflect disciplinary takeover bids? Top management change after a success 
takeover bid may be perceived to be disciplinary because it aids speedy firm 
reorganization when target firm management is out of the way. The market corporate 
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control is the epitome of capital markets and this market depends on existing corporate 
governance structures to work. As the court of last resort, takeovers help shareholders 
shop around for new management where internal controls are weak   
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